Monday, February 9, 2009

Another Amicus in Support of Prometheus: Myriad Genetics

I have already posted (here and here) most of the amicus briefs that have been filed in Prometheus v. Mayo, all arguing for a reversal of the district court’s decision finding that Prometheus’ personalized medicine claim are patent-ineligible under section 101. This third installment brings you the brief filed by Myriad Genetics in support of Prometheus (Myriad Brief) – to my knowledge this was the only outstanding brief that I had not yet posted.

Myriad is a leader in the commercialization of genetics diagnostic testing, probably best known for its BRCA tests used to assess a woman’s genetic predisposition to breast cancer. Since the late 1990s the company has been the subject of widespread criticism, both in the U.S. and abroad, over what many have perceived to be overly aggressive patent enforcement policies, particularly with regard to its BRCA patents. In fact, much of the criticism directed at so-called “gene patents” traces back to the controversy surrounding Myriad. To this day, allegations that Myriad’s patent policies have somehow unduly limited access to BRCA testing services, or even prevented competing laboratories from providing superior BRCA testing services, are cited in support of proposals to ban the patenting of genes and DNA.

Personally, I am skeptical of the charges that have been leveled against Myriad, and to my knowledge many of the allegations have little or no basis in reality. Clearly Myriad has sought to use its patents to block commercial competitors, but my understanding is that the tests they provide are generally high quality, the cost of their testing services is not significantly greater than comparable tests for genetic conditions not covered by patents, and patients are not being denied access to superior testing options by Myriad’s patent enforcement policies. Nevertheless, it is clear that Myriad’s public relations have suffered as a result of the publicity generated by the BRCA patent controversy.

In assessing Myriad’s amicus brief, it is important to realize that for Myriad it is not enough for the Federal Circuit to decide in favor of Prometheus; the manner in which the Federal Circuit reaches its decision is almost as critical Myriad. In other words, Prometheus could prevail in a manner that would nevertheless cast doubt on the patent-eligibility of many of Myriad’s patents, including its BRCA method-of-testing patents. As pointed out in its brief, these process patents play a much greater role in protecting genetic diagnostic testing than do composition of matter claims.

In particular, Prometheus and many of its amicus supporters argue that the Federal Circuit should reverse the district court’s erroneous conclusion that the correlation between a non-naturally occurring drug breakdown product and the optimal dosage of the drug (which is itself a non-naturally occurring chemical compound) is a "natural phenomenon." In my Law Professors Brief, for example, we argue that whatever the Supreme Court might have meant when it held that "natural phenomena” are patent-inelgibile, the term cannot be interpreted so broadly as to encompass a correlation that exist solely as a consequence of active human intervention. We also point out that the controversial claim 13 at issue in LabCorp, in contrast to the Prometheus claims, relates to a true natural phenomena involving naturally occurring metabolites and existing independently of any human intervention. Thus, the Federal Circuit could easily find the Prometheus claims patent-eligible without necessarily finding the LabCorp claim patent-eligible.

Importantly, the distinction between natural and non-natural correlations at the center of our argument would not only rescue Prometheus’ claims, but a host of other personalized medicine and method of treatment claims involving non-naturally occurring drugs. However, it would not necessarily save Myriad’s patents, many of which, which like the LabCorp claim, relate to naturally occurring correlations, e.g., the correlation between a mutation in the BRCA gene and a predisposition for cancer.

In its brief, Prometheus characterizes itself as a "personalized medicine company," rather than a genetic diagnostic testing company. To me, it seems a bit of a stretch to label a test for mutations relating to a predisposition for cancer as "personalized medicine." I suppose that in a sense any diagnostic method is designed to address the specific medical needs of an individual patient, but usually the term personalized medicine is meant to suggest something more. Personalized medicine usually refers to a synergistic application of diagnostic testing in conjunction with a specific drug or drugs.

Nevertheless, it is not surprising that Myriad would want to position itself as a personalized doesn't company, in hopes of benefitng from all the positive buzz currently surrounding the field of personalized medicine. All of the amici supporting Prometheus argue that patents could be important incentives in the development of personalized medicine. On the other hand, many have argued that patents are generally not necessary to incentivize the identification of genetic mutations and the development of diagnostic testing services; some have even gone so far as to argue that patents impede the availability of certain diagnostic testing. In 2002, for example, legislation was introduced in Congress that would have shielded certain providers of genetic testing services from patent liability (it did not go anywhere).

In any event, for Myriad it is important that the Federal Circuit decide Prometheus in a manner that does not rely on any distinction between natural and unnatural compounds, but instead in a manner that would also find the LabCorp claim (and by implication Myriad’s genetic diagnostic claims) patent-eligible.

To this end, Myriad argues :

[Although the] recitation of administering an unnatural drug is one valid basis for finding the Prometheus claims patent-ineligible, [the court should] find that the Prometheus claims are patent-eligible . . . on a more fundamental level shared by the claims in LabCorp. . . . From a policy perspective, this is the critical point in this case. If this Court finds Prometheus is claims patent-ineligible, the industry of personalized medicine as a whole will be in jeopardy. If, on the other hand, this Court holds that Prometheus is claims are patent-eligible solely because they recite an unnatural drug, then only a very small segment of personalized medicine will be spared. Virtually all of the rest of the industry will be wiped away because most personalized medicine products are unrelated to drug therapies.


For more on personalized medicine and patents, you might want to check out this recent PTO presentation on the patenting of personalized medicine. Notice that the PTO presentation defines personalized medicine in a manner that would exclude Prometheus' claims (by limiting itself to information from a patient's genotype), but that would broadly encompass Myriad's BRCA claims (because the definition is not limited to the use of drugs). The presentation suggests to me that the PTO would find some of Myriad's issued BRCA testing claims patent ineligible under Bilski, because they are not tied to a machine/apparatus or performing a transformation (see Example 3 in particular).

Patent Doc Kevin Noonan provides his own commentary on the PTO presentation here . For example, he explains that under the PTO approach a patentee might need to include a method of treatment step in order to render a diagnostic claim patent-eligible, but including a treatment limitation raises a practical obstacle to enforcing the patent - there might not be a single entity who infringes all of the claim limitations. Methods of treatment are generally performed by health care providers. As explained by Kevin:

[I]t may frequently be the case that the actor who performs the diagnostic step of determining whether a patient bears a diagnostically-relevant SNP is a different actor than the one who performs the method of treatment step. This dichotomy of action then directly implicates the principle enunciate[d] in the Muniauction case, that a claim cannot be infringed by joint tortfeasors unless there is one actor exercising direction and control over the others.



Thursday, February 5, 2009

Novartis Files Amicus Brief Supporting Prometheus

For those following Prometheus v. Mayo, I am posting an amicus brief filed by Novartis in support of Prometheus, and the patentability of the personalized medicine claims at issue (Novartis Brief). Prometheus’ appellate brief, and amici briefs filed by myself on behalf of a group of patent law professor, BIO, and AIPLA are provided on an earlier post, along with some commentary.

In its brief, which asks the court to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Mayo on the grounds of section 101 invalidity, Novartis echoes many of the arguments made in the other briefs, i.e., that the district court erred in focusing its analysis on certain elements of the claim (in particular the "wherein clauses") while failing to consider the claim as a whole, that the claim as a whole satisfies the Bilski machine-transformation test, that the district court’s rationale, if taken to its logical extreme, would put claims to methods of treatment employing new drugs at risk, and that the decision threatens to stifle innovation in personalized medicine and health care in general.

Novartis also makes an argument that I don’t think appears in any of the other briefs that have been filed. In particular, Novartis argues that the district court’s claim construction is flawed because the court erroneously disregarded the claim’s preamble. In considering this argument, it is useful to look at the actual claim language.

Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 is representative:

A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:

(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and

(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,

wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8 x 108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject and

wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8 x 108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject.

Patent claims can generally be broken down into three discrete elements – the preamble, transition and body. Most commonly, the transition is the word “comprising” (a word that has special significance in claim interpretation), the preamble is the language preceding the transition, and the body is the remainder of the claim. Thus, the preamble of Prometheus’ claim is “a method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,” and the body of the claim is everything after “comprising.”

Significantly, the general rule is that the claim preamble is not taken into account when construing the scope of the claim. Rather, the function of the preamble normally is merely to identify what kind of invention is being claimed. It is the body of the claim which provides the claim limitations which define the claimed subject matter. However, as correctly noted by Novartis, the general rule against using the preamble in claim construction does not apply in certain circumstances, particularly when the preamble is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claim. Novartis argues, I think rather persuasively, that the claims at issue might warrant a consideration of the preamble in a manner that constrains the scope of the claims. I’m not sure if Prometheus ever made this argument; I don’t believe it appears in their appellant brief.

According to Novartis, consideration of the preamble and claim construction limits the claim to a “method of optimizing treatment whereby a dose administered to a patient is adjusted based on the determination of a level of drug metabolite.” If Novartis is correct, it could have some bearing on the patent eligibility of the claim. For example, in Bilski the Federal Circuit noted that the fundamental test for patent eligibility involves a determination of whether the claim “wholly preempts” a fundamental principle. In Prometheus, the alleged fundamental principle is the correlation between the level of drug breakdown products and optimal drug dosage. Alternatively, one might argue that the “wherein” clauses (which are really at the heart of the discovery upon which Prometheus' invention is based) constitute an attempt to patent a mental process, i.e., the recognition of a correlation. But when the claim is construed as limited to a method of optimizing treatment, it would appear that there are other substantial and useful non-infringing uses of the correlation, thus avoiding preemption of the principle.

Tuesday, January 27, 2009

Amicus Briefs Filed in Prometheus v. Mayo, an Important Case for Biotechnology and the Future of Personalized Medicine

I have explained in several previous posts (on this blog and on Patently-O) why Prometheus v. Mayo is an important case for biotechnology, with particularly important implications for future innovation in diagnostics and personalized medicine. In Prometheus, the district court invalidated personalized medicine claims under 35 USC 101as patent-ineligible, based on its finding that a correlation between the level of non-naturally occurring drug breakdown products in a patient's body and the optimal drug dosage is an unpatentable “natural phenomenon.” In my view, the district court erred in characterizing a non-naturally drug breakdown product, and the interaction of those breakdown products with the human body, as natural phenomena. If not corrected, this erroneous interpretation of Section 101 could have a profound detrimental impact on patenting and innovation in the life sciences, particular with respect to new technologies relating to preventive and personalized medicine. A copy of Prometheus’s appellant brief is provided here.

Last week, I filed an amicus brief in Prometheus on behalf of myself and several other concerned patent law professors (Law Profs Brief). The brief supports neither party, and ventures no opinion on the ultimate patentability of the claims, but does argue that the rationale set forth by the district court for invalidating the Prometheus claims is incorrect and potentially harmful. It also argues that Bilski has not rendered moot the distinction between natural and non-natural phenomena, and that Bilski’s machine-transformation test will likely prove insufficient and appropriate for many patent claims arising out of the life sciences. It also points out the potential for unintended consequences and uncertainty with respect to a host of claims relating to biotech and pharma, and particularly with respect to the burgeoning field of personalized medicine. It also distinguishes the claims at issue from the oft-discussed claim 13 from LabCorp v. Metabolite, which relates to a correlation involving naturally occurring metabolites as opposed to non-naturally occurring drug breakdown products. Law Profs ask the Federal Circuit to reverse the district court on its determination that the correlation between the level of drug breakdown products in the human body and the optimal dosage of the drug is an unpatentable “natural phenomenon.”

The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO Brief) has also filed a brief supporting neither party, but like Law Profs arguing that the district court erred in its application of section 101 to invalidate Prometheus claims.

The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA Brief) has filed a brief in support of Prometheus, likewise arguing for a reversal of the district court’s judgment that the claims are invalid under Section 101.

I understand that Myriad also filed a brief in support of Prometheus, but I have only seen a draft and cannot definitely confirm that it was filed. As a leading diagnostics company, Myriad obviously has a major stake in the outcome of this case. The draft I saw argued that patents on the inventions claimed in Prometheus and LabCorp are critical for ensuring innovation in diagnostics and personalized medicine.

Law Profs, BIO and AIPLA all join with Prometheus in arguing that the district court erred in characterizing this correlation between a non-naturally occurring drug breakdown product and optimal drug dosage as a natural phenomenon. They also all make the point that if not reversed, the district court's misapplication of Section 101 could have profound unintended negative consequences on future innovation and biotechnology, with particular emphasis placed on the effect on personalized medicine. Law Profs and BIO argue that the Bilski machine-transformation test is not well-suited for determining patent eligibility for inventions arising in the life sciences. BIO and AIPLA argue that in any event, the Prometheus claims satisfy both the machine and transformation prongs of the Bilski test. They also fault the district court for improperly focusing on individual claim elements, rather than the patentability of the claim as a whole, and note the potential for abuse if courts disregard claim limitations as mere “insubstantial post-solution activity.”

Friday, December 19, 2008

Classen v. Biogen: The Federal Circuit Applies Bilski to the Life Sciences

In a non-precedential opinion, a panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision in Classen v. Biogen to invalidate Dr. Classen’s process claims for encompassing patent-ineligible subject matter. I have previously discussed the district court decision in posts to this blog and Patently-O. The claims are directed to methods for determining an optimal immunization schedule based on comparing the observed incidence of immune-mediated disorders in treatment groups subjected to different vaccination schedules.

The decision, in its entirety, states as follows: “In light of our decision in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment that these claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dr. Classen’s claims are neither “tied to a particular machine or apparatus” nor do they ‘transform[] a particular article into a different state or thing.’ Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954. Therefore we affirm.”

The opinion ducks important issues. Contrary to the holding, the claims do in fact involve a transformation, e.g., claim 1 of 5,723,283 recites a ‘method . . . which comprises immunizing mammals in the treatment group of mammals with one or more doses of one or more immunogens . . ..” The immunization of a mammal clearly effects a transformation of a particular article [a mammal] into a different state [a state of induced immunity]. It is inconceivable that this does not constitute a transformation; if that were the case, it would logically follow that all method of treatment claims are patent-ineligible. Rather, the court implicitly must have determined that, in the context of the claims at issue, immunization of a mammal constitutes an “insubstantial extra-solution activity.” In Bilski, the court held that an otherwise patent-ineligible process is not rendered patentable by tagging on an insubstantial additional step. The court could have provided some needed guidance by explaining its basis for determining that the immunization step is insubstantial, but instead the court decided to punt on the issue.

The lower courts decision was less than fully coherent on the basis for its determination that claims are patent-ineligible, at times asserting that the claims are invalid for claiming a mental process, while at other times complaining that that the claims encompass a natural phenomenon. The district court concluded that “[c]learly, the correlation between vaccination schedules and the incidence of immune mediated disorders that Dr. Classen claims to have discovered is a natural phenomenon.” The court provided absolutely no reasoning to support this conclusion. To my mind, it is not at all clear that it can be so blithely assumed that vaccination is a natural phenomenon. That would depend upon how vaccination is defined, but clearly immunization using human-generated vaccines is not something that occurs absent human intervention.

As I discussed in my previous post to Patently-O, to my mind the Bilski machine-transformation test is inappropriate in some cases involving natural phenomena. For example, a claim encompassing photosynthesis in a plant involves a transformation of a particular article [carbon dioxide and water] into a different thing [sugar and oxygen], so it passes the Bilski test. But it cannot be patentable under Supreme Court precedent, since it encompasses a natural phenomenon. I think the Federal Circuit needs to be careful in blinding applying the Bilski test to a claim arguably directed to a natural phenomenon.

A similar case is currently pending before the Federal Circuit, Prometheus v. Mayo, discussed in my earlier posts. The district court in Prometheus also found that the claims at issue encompass an unpatentable natural phenomenon, i.e., the correlation between the amount of a drug metabolite in a patient’s body with the optimal dosage of the drug. Unlike vaccination, which arguably encompasses the natural introduction of an immunogen into a patient’s body, the correlation at issue in Prometheus is entirely the results of the introduction of a non-naturally occurring drug into the patient. While the vaccination in Classen arguably can be interpreted so as to encompass a natural phenomenon, the correlation in Prometheus is not what I would consider to be a natural phenomenon. To hold otherwise would establish dangerous precedent, but the Federal Circuit might never even address the issue if it proceeds to simply apply the Bilski test in a reflexive manner, as appears to have to been the case in Classen.

I would also point out that the Classen decision does not bode well for a host of issued patent claims, particularly genetic diagnostic method claims which purport to broadly encompass any method of identifying a mutation.

Wednesday, December 3, 2008

WARF Unable to Persuade EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal to Allow Human Embryonic Stem Cell Claims

On November 25, 2008, the European Patent Office (EPO) Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) affirmed a Technical Board of Appeal (TBA) decision refusing a Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) patent application claiming cultured primate embryonic stem cells. (The EBA can be analogized to the Supreme Court of the EPO.) The corresponding US patent, No. 5, 843,780, has been the subject of controversy in the US, but nonetheless recently survived an ex parte reexamination challenge. The inter partes reexamination of a related WARF stem cell patent was discussed in a previous post. An appeal of that decision is currently pending.

In its decision, the EBA held that WARF’s stem cell claims violate Rule 28(c) of the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention, which states “[u]nder Article 53(a), European patents shall not be granted in respect of biotechnological inventions which [uses] human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes.” The EBA based its decision on the fact that, at the time the application was filed, production of the claimed stem cells necessarily entailed the use and destruction of a human embryo, which the Board characterized as an industrial purpose within the meaning of Rule 28 (c). WARF argued that the claims are directed to cells, not embryos, but the EBA found that Rule 28(c) applies not only to subject matter of the claims but rather to the invention as a whole, which includes the methodology required to make the claimed invention.

WARF argued that the claimed embryonic stem cells could be used for research purposes, and that research is not “industrial or commercial” in nature. However, the EBA pointed out that Article 28(c) traces its origin to Article 6(c) of the Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998. As originally drafted, Article 6(c) would have banned the patenting of any method in which human embryos are used. However, in order to allow the patenting of inventions which could be used to treat human embryos, i.e., procedures designed to benefit a human embryo, the Article 6(c) was amended to recite “uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes.” In other words, the industrial or commercial purposes limitation was intended to allow for the patenting of inventions intended to benefit a human embryo, not to permit the patenting of inventions which exploit (let alone destroy) human embryos for research purposes. The EBA found that European legislators were concerned with preventing misuse in the sense of a commodification of human embryos, and that one of thire essential objectives was the protection of human dignity. The Board also pointed out that, consistent with its interpretation of legislative intent, the European Community excludes funding for research which results in the destruction of human embryos, including for the procurement of stem cells.

WARF further argued that the term “embryo” as used in Rule 28(c) should be interpreted as limited to embryos of 14 days or older. However, the EBA found that this narrow interpretation would be inconsistent with the intent of European legislators, pointing out that under German law an embryo is defined as including a fertilized egg, and UK law defines an embryo so as to encompass a two cell zygote and an egg in the process of fertilization. The EBA rejected also characterized WARF’s proposed narrow definition of embryo as inconsistent with a legislative intent to protect human dignity and prevent the commercialization of embryos.

WARF, and other interested parties who voiced their opinions in the case, urged the EBA to find the invention patentable based on “balancing the benefits of the invention for humanity against the prejudice to the embryo.” However, the EBA found that it was not the proper forum to decide such policy issues, particularly given the clear legislative intent to exclude inventions such as the one at issue from patentability.

Finally, WARF argued that the claims should be patentable because today the claimed human embryonic stem cells could be derived directly from other human embryonic cell lines, thereby avoiding the necessity for further destruction of human embryos. But the EBA rejected this argument also, finding that when assessing whether a claim contravenes Rule 28(c), technical developments which became publicly available only after the filing date cannot be taken into consideration. To hold otherwise, according to the EBA, could unduly prejudice the rights of a third party who might later provide an innocuous way to carry out the invention (presumably a method not involving the destruction of human embryos).

Monday, December 1, 2008

Genomics-Based Patents: Are Prophetic Assertions of Utility Enough?

During the late 1990s and early 2000s large-scale gene sequencing projects led to a wealth of newly identified human gene sequences, and a flood of patent applications attempting to lay claim to them. With so many laboratories cranking out newly discovered gene sequences every day there was huge pressure to file patent applications early, in many cases before the biological role of the gene or gene product had been assessed experimentally. In an attempt to satisfy the utility requirement, which essentially requires a patent applicant to disclose a practical use of a genetic sequence that is specific, substantial and credible, patent applicants resorted to the disclosure of “prophetic utilities.” Often times these predictions were based on sequence similarity (i.e., homology) between the sequence of the newly discovered gene product and a protein or family of proteins of known function, or identification of tissue or disease state-specific expression of the gene. In many cases this limited information was supplemented by providing essentially a laundry list of potential uses of the gene, typically involving use of the gene or genes product as a drug or diagnostic, or in the development of a drug or diagnostic. The hope was that at least one of the proposed uses would actually pan out, and the patent applicant would be able to point to the disclosure of the utility in the patent application as evidence that the utility was disclosed at the time of filing.

Although many of these applications resulted in the issuance of patents directed to the gene, the protein product of the gene, antibodies specific for the protein product, etc., it is not at all clear whether these patents would withstand a determined validity challenge during litigation. I am not aware of any case where one of these patents has actually been successfully asserted in court, either in the US or abroad. In my recent survey of human gene patent litigation in the US (“Trend in Human Gene Patent Litigation,” Science, 322:198-99 (2008)), I identified only one lawsuit in which a genomic-based patent was asserted. The lawsuit was filed by Incyte (a leading genomics company during the peak of the gene patenting frenzy, and one of the leading holders of human gene patents) against Invitrogen. Incyte appears to have filed the lawsuit in retaliation for a patent lawsuit that Invitrogen had previously filed against Incyte. Incyte and Invitrogen settled prior to any substantive briefing by the parties, so there is no indication from this lawsuit as to how Incyte's gene patents would have fared against a validity challenge.

Other major genomic companies that patented many genes based on prophetic assertions of utility, such as Human Genome Sciences, Lexicon Genetics and Millenium Pharmaceuticals, have apparently never asserted any of these patents in court. Many of these turn-of-the- century genomic companies have in recent years sought to reposition themselves as pharmaceutical companies, as the genomic-based business models have lost much of their appeal. They have also chosen not to pay maintenance fees on many of these patents, allowing them to enter the public domain. New patent filings on genes have also reportedly dropped off in recent years (see cite in my Science article).

On a number of occasions, the US Patent Office’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) has affirmed rejections of genomic-based patent claims under 35 USC 101 and 112 for lack of utility. For example, in Ex Parte Lee (2004 WL 1967421) claims to a newly discovered gene, and the corresponding protein, were rejected for failure to identify a specific utility in the application as filed. On appeal, the applicant attempted to establish utility based on post-filing date gene knockout experiments that allegedly showed that at least one of the predicted utilities actually panned out. However, the Board rejected this argument and affirmed the rejection of both the protein and DNA claims, finding that the predicted utilities were only speculative at the time the application was filed, and there was no evidence that the utility had been adequately demonstrated as of the filing date of the application.

For another example, see Ex Parte Lal, 2007 WL 1878008, an unsuccessful appeal by Incyte of a rejection based on lack of utility. The application as filed disclosed that the most similar prior art sequence the applicant could find to the protein product of the claimed gene sequence was a taste receptor, and Incyte argued that this constituted a sufficient assertion of utility. The BPAI rejected this argument, and found that post-filing date evidence that the protein actually was a taste receptor was insufficient, since the utility had not been established as of the date of filing.

On July 31, 2008 the British Royal Courts of Justice revoked a Human Genome Sciences (HGS) genomic patent claiming a member of the TNF ligand superfamily, which HGS identified as “Neutrokine-alpha.” (Eli Lilly v. Human Genome Sciences [2008] EWHC 1903 (Pat)). HGS knew at the time it filed its patent application that the newly discovered gene appeared to be a member of the TNF ligand superfamily, based on sequence similarity. The patent application discloses this fact, and includes a host of predicted utilities, many of them based on the known diverse activities of other members of the TNF superfamily. The British court found the claims to be invalid based on lack of industrial applicability (utility), insufficiency (enablement) and obviousness. In particular, the Court found that by disclosing a huge number of speculative (and often contradictory) utilities, the application in effect failed to provide any real teaching of utility and thus fail to solve any technical problem. The court was highly critical of this laundry list approach to satisfying the industrial applicability requirement. The decision cites a number of EPO Technical Board of Appeals decisions relating to patent applications disclosing prophetic utilities for biological molecules and arriving at a similar outcome.

One aspect of the British decision I found interesting, and quite different from US practice, was the Court’s ruling on obviousness. Lilly raised a number of obviousness challenges to the patent, based on prior art disclosures of clones containing partial sequences of the claimed gene, e.g., EST sequences, but the Court held that these partial sequences were insufficient to render HGS’s successful cloning of the full-length gene obvious. However, the Court held that since the specification contains more no more than a range of speculative applications of the gene, which the Court characterized as implausible, it fails to teach a person skilled in the art how to solve any technical problem. In essence, the court finds that because the applicant failed to meaningfully identify a use for the gene, the patent was invalid not only for lack of industrial activity, but also for lack of inventive step, i.e., obviousness.

Saturday, November 22, 2008

University of Utah Achieves [Modest?] Victories in Fight for European BRCA Patents

[Note from Author - In my original post, I characterized the patentholder's victories as modest. It has since been pointed out to me that frameshift mutations account for a large percentage of the relevant mutations inBRCA1, so the most recent decision allowing claims directed to methods of detecting frameshift mutations in EP699754 could constitute more than a modest victory for the patentholder. Since the decision has not been published, and I am only going off of the EPO press release, it is impossible to know the actual scope of the remaining claims. We will have to await the decision before making any sort of real conclusion as to the import of the remaining claims.]

On November 19, 2008, a Technical Board of Appeal (TBA) of the European Patent Office (EPO) decided that EP 699754, a European patent relating to the BRCA1 gene and methods for diagnosing a predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer by identifying mutations in the gene, is to be maintained in an amended form. The patent is assigned to the University of Utah, but it is widely reported that Myriad Genetics is a real party in interest – Myriad was initially an assignee of the patent, but later the designation of Myriad as a proprietor was removed from the patent, perhaps owing to the widespread negative feelings towards Myriad in Europe which resulted from a perception that the company was engaging in overly aggressive enforcement tactics.

The patent was opposed by a number of groups from the public and private sectors of various European countries, including research institutes in various national centers for human genetics, and the initial opposition proceedings had resulted in a full revocation of the patent in 2004. On appeal, the TBA set-aside the initial opposition decision and reinstated the patent, albeit in an amended form.

The TBA decision and the text of the amended claims do not appear to have been posted on the EPO website yet, according to an EPO press release the claims have been narrowed to encompass only diagnostic methods for the detection of a predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer caused by a specific group of mutations of the gene, so-called frame-shift mutations. The patent in its current form does not contain claims directed to the BRCA1 gene itself or to mutated forms thereof. According to the press release, the patent cannot be further contested at the European level, indicating that the TBA rejected any requests by the University for referral to the Expanded Board of Appeals (EBA). The patent will still be susceptible to challenge at a national level.

This is the third case in which the University of Utah has succeeded in maintaining European BRCA1 patents, but in each case the resulting claims are significantly narrower than both the originally issued European claims and Myriad’s corresponding BRCA1 patents in the US.

A week earlier, on November 13, 2008, the EPO issued another press release reporting that another University of Utah BRCA1 patent, EP 705903, is likewise to be maintained in an amended form resulting in much narrower claims than the original patent. In this case, the TBA affirmed the result of the initial opposition proceedings, which resulted in the revocation of all diagnostic method claims, leaving only claims relating to a “gene probe of a defined composition for the detection of one specific BRCA1 mutation,” reportedly relating to a mutation specific to Ashkenazi Jewish populations. The actual TBA decision has not been posted yet, but should be in due course.

The first TBA decision relating to one of the universities BRCA1 patents (T 1213/05) was decided September 27, 2007, and resulted in the maintenance of EP 705902, albeit with substantially narrowed claims. Initially, the patent included a claim directed to the full-length BRCA1 gene, and another claim broadly encompassing hybridization probes capable of recognizing BRCA1 mutations. The claims ultimately allowed by the TBA are limited to a single probe capable of recognizing one exon of BRCA1, and several other probes capable of recognizing some BRCA1 intron-exon junctions. It is unclear how relevant these probe claims are to BRCA1 testing in its current state, but I suspect that the claims could be readily avoided by the use of diagnostic testing procedures that do not rely on the specific probes. I think it will be difficult to argue for an expansive interpretation of the claims, particularly in view of emphatic statements in the TBA decision to the effect that the claims are limited to probes (emphasis in the TBA decision), and the invalidation of the claims reciting the full-length gene and the broad genus of probes capable of detecting mutation.

The TBA decision regarding EP 705902 is available through the EPO website, and includes a number of interesting features. For one thing, sequencing errors in the initial US patents applications prevented the university from relying on these applications as priority documents. Unable to benefit from the earlier priority dates, the TBA found that the broader claims were anticipated by the inventors’ own publication of the correct sequence in Science prior to filing a US patent application including the correct sequences. In the US, with its one-year grace period, publication less than one year before the application filing date will not stand as a bar to patentability. But in Europe, which lacks any grace period, publication prior to the filing of a patent application results in a lack of novelty. This decision highlights the vulnerability of any DNA patent, particularly in Europe, which is based upon a patent application containing a sequencing error. This could be a significant issue, given the relatively high error rate in DNA sequencing. Of course, this error rate depends upon the methodology used for sequencing, when the sequencing was performed, the expertise of the party performing the sequencing, etc.

The opponents of EP 705902 argued that the patent is invalid for violating the “ordre public,” or morality, as referred to in Article 53(a) ofteh European Patent Convention (EPC). In particular, they argued that the patents were immoral based on the university’s failure to provide proof that the patients whose genetic mutations had been instrumental in identifying the gene had provided informed consent to use the information to secure a patent. The TBA rejected this argument, finding that there is no obligation for a patent applicant to provide evidence of informed consent.

The opponents also argued that the patent is immoral because of the social and economic consequences, i.e., the patent would only result in increased costs for patients, would influence the way in which diagnosis and research will be organized in Europe, and would clearly be to the detriment of patients and doctors. The TBA responded that 53(a) pertains to cases where “exploitation of the invention” would be immoral, not “explication of the patent.” Since the objections were raised against the patent rather than the underlying invention, the board determined that the EPO was not the proper venue for considering the socio-economic effects of a patent directed to a legitimate invention.

On t he other hand, the TBA also rejected challenges to the narrow claims which did survive the initial opposition proceedings. For example, the opponents of the patent argued that the probes recited in the university’s surviving claims were invalid for lack of novelty, based on a prior art reference disclosing a yeast artificial chromosome (YAC) allegedly including exon 11 and other exons of BRCA1. Claim 1 in the patent surviving opposition recites a probe comprising a sequence fragment derived from exon 11. However, the board rejected this argument, finding that the opponents had failed to establish with a sufficient degree of certainty that the YAC clone actually contained any of the sequences specified in claim 1.

The opponents also argued that the claims allowed after opposition lacked an “inventive step,” i.e., that the claims were obvious in view of a prior art reference which identified the location of a breast cancer gene in an approximately 1.5 Megabase (Mb) region of a human chromosome. This turned out to be the location of BRCA1. The opponents argued that once the location of the gene had been mapped with this degree of specificity, it only involved routine experimentation to clone and sequence the gene. They alleged that the university had won the race simply due to working harder and putting more money into the project. However, the TBA rejected this argument, finding that even after the general location of the gene had been mapped, finding the mutation “would not only involve a substantial amount of work, but would also require a ‘lucky strike’, which could in no way be predicted” based on the prior art.

These three European BRCA1 decisions are significant for at least two reasons. First, although the University of Utah (and Myriad) can claim partial victories, it is unclear how relevant the resulting patents are, and to what extent they impose meaningful restrictions on competing providers of BRCA1 testing in Europe. And secondly, the decisions provide some insight into legal arguments that could be made in the US if the BRCA1 patents were ever challenged in court. As I reported in a recent Science article (Christopher M. Holman, “Trend in Human Gene Patent Litigation,” Science, 322:198-99 (2008)), Myriad has only asserted its BRCA1 patents in two lawsuits, both filed more than 10 years ago. Both cases were quickly settled and dismissed, prior to any substantive decisions pertaining to the scope or validity of the claims. The EPO decisions at least point out some potential vulnerabilities of the much broader US BRCA1 patents, and perhaps gene patents in general.

For more information, follow this link for an EPO press release, which provides information on these decisions and links to other relevant press releases.