Thursday, July 28, 2011

Myraid Alerts Federal Circuit Judges that Key Plaintiff in AMP v. PTO Apparently Cannot Perform Clinical BRCA Testing

During oral arguments in AMP v. PTO (the ACLU/PubPat attack on Myriad Genetic’s BRCA gene patents, previously discussed here), the panel of Federal Circuit judges hearing the case evinced some skepticism as to whether any of the named plaintiffs have standing to bring the lawsuit. For example, many of the plaintiffs are patients who would not appear to be in any real threat of being sued by Myriad for patent infringement.

The plaintiffs most likely to have standing are probably the clinicians who the ACLU argues would engage in BRCA testing were it not for the Myriad patents. However, the declarations by these plaintiffs do not unambiguously state that the plaintiff would begin doing BRCA testing if the patents are invalidated. Instead, they merely declare that the plaintiff has the "capability and desire" to perform the tests, and that the plaintiff "has all the personnel, expertise, and facilities necessary to do various types of sequencing." These declarations were drafted by lawyers, and I think the language used is meaningful, reflecting the fact that these clinicians have not committed to performing BRCA testing if the patents are invalidated.

During oral arguments the Federal Circuit judges pushed the ACLU attorney to clarify whether this language indicated a commitment to perform the tests, implying that a mere "capability and desire" to perform the test might not be sufficient to generate the degree of controversy necessary for standing. In my opinion, the ACLU attorney never provided a clear answer to the question, which suggests that in fact these clinicians have not committed to performing the tests.

Yesterday, Myriad's attorneys sent a letter to the Federal Circuit judges informing them that one of the key clinician plaintiffs who submitted this sort of declaration, Dr. Harry Osterer, has left his position at the NYU Langone Medical Center, and apparently is no longer in a position to offer clinical BRCA genetic testing. Attached to the letter is a printout from the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, identifying Dr. Osterer as a new professor at Albert Einstein. In the letter, Myriad's attorneys state that Albert Einstein does not offer, and is not qualified offer, clinical genetic testing. If this is correct, this seems to further undercut any pretense that he is committed to offering clinical BRCA testing if the patents are invalidated. A copy of the letter is attached here.

Sunday, July 24, 2011

Myriad Genetics Files Amicus Briefs in Joint Infringement Cases Akamai and McKesson

Personalized medicine company Myriad Genetics has filed amicus briefs in Akamai and McKesson, two cases currently pending before the en banc Federal Circuit that address the doctrine of joint infringement (aka divided infringement). These cases have been the subject of much discussion elsewhere, see for example the Patently-O and Patent Docs blogs. In a nutshell, the Federal Circuit seeks to delineate the circumstances under which a party will be held liable for patent infringement when multiple parties perform all steps of the patented method in concert, but no single party performs all of the steps.

In its amicus briefs, which are largely redundant, Myriad points out that while the recent joint infringement cases coming out of the Federal Circuit have tended to involve claims directed towards business methods and software, the decisions have created case law with substantial negative implications for patents on diagnostics and personalized medicine. Molecular diagnostics generally involve the discovery of a correlation between a molecular marker (e.g., a genetic variation, or the level of a metabolite) and a clinically relevant indication (e.g., whether an individual has a predisposition to a disease such as cancer, or would be likely to benefit from a particular drug or course of therapeutic treatment). Patent protection for these discoveries is generally achieved by means of a method claim reciting two steps-(1) detecting the molecular marker in a patient, and (2) recognizing the correlation. As noted in the Myriad briefs, product claims on the molecular markers themselves (e.g., isolated DNA molecules or proteins), and methods of testing for them, are generally precluded in the post-Human Genome Project era by prior art (not to mention efforts by the ACLU and others to render such products unpatentable).

The problem from the perspective of a molecular diagnostic innovator company such as Myriad is that the Federal Circuit's recent joint infringement decisions would seem to dictate that such a method claim would not be infringed under circumstances where one party (e.g., a diagnostic testing laboratory) performs the first step and an independent second party (e.g., a doctor) performs the second. Under recent Federal Circuit case law, assuming that the parties are not in an agency relationship, it seems likely that in most instances no party would be found infringing, and the patent owner would be left without a remedy, even in the face of substantial infringement in competition with its business.

In its briefs, Myriad notes that the Federal Circuit has repeatedly admonished patent owners that problems of divided infringement could have been avoided if the claims have been better drafted, i.e., in a manner such that a single party performs all of the steps of a method claim. However, Myriad argues (correctly I think) that the patent eligibility doctrine effectively forecloses this course of action. The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Prometheus (discussed previously on this blogs), in particular, interprets Bilski as rendering patent ineligible a claim reciting nothing more than the mere recognition of a correlation per se (which the court equates with patenting a mental step). In order to be patent eligible, Prometheus seems to require a diagnostic method claim to explicitly recite a transformative step, such as detecting the marker, or treating a patient. This creates a Catch-22 for the diagnostic inventor. The discovery of the correlation is the core of the invention, providing substantial therapeutic benefits to patients, but under Prometheus and Bilksi a claim to the correlation must also include an additional step which will often render the claim highly susceptible to circumvention by two parties separately performing the steps.

To avoid this problem, Myriad proposes the following as an appropriate test for infringement of method claims by multiple parties:

When a first party performing one or more steps of a method claim actively causes another party to perform the other steps of the same method claim, or when two parties act in a concerted manner to perform all steps of a method claim, then the first party and the parties acting in concert should each be deemed a direct infringer.

Thursday, July 14, 2011

District Court Rules That Genencor Products Infringe Novozymes Patent

On July 7, a federal district court in the Western District of Wisconsin ruled on a motion for summary judgment that a number of Genencor's thermostable alpha-amylase products (sold under trade names such as Spezyme) infringe Novozyme’s US patent number 7,713,723. I have discussed earlier decisions in this case on this blog, including decisions by the District Court denying a motion to invalidate the claims for failure to satisfy the written description requirement (available here) and denying a motion for preliminary injunction (available here).

Claim 1 is representative of the claims found to be infringed:

1. An isolated variant of a parent alpha-amylase, wherein:
(a) the variant has at least 90% sequence identity to SEQ ID NO: 6,
(b) the variant comprises a substitution of serine at position 239 relative to the parent alpha-amylase, using the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO: 8 for determining position numbering, and
(c) the variant has increased thermostability relative to the parent
alpha-amylase, wherein thermostability is determined at pH 4.5, 90° C. and
5 ppm calcium and has alpha-amylase activity.

Prior to deciding the issue of infringement, the court had to construe several terms appearing in the claims.

For example, the court had to define what "thermostability" means in the context of the claims. The defendant Genencor argued that the term is so indefinite that the claims should be invalidated, but the judge disagreed and held that the term was not so ambiguous as to render the claims invalid. The court spent a lot of time discussing the ambiguity of the term, noting that it could be the case that a protein variant would have more activity than wild type at some time points after exposing the proteins to elevated temperature, but less activity at other time points, and it was not entirely clear from the patent whether this would constitute increased thermostability. However, the court held that even under a relatively narrow interpretation of the term, pursuant to which the protein variant would have to be more active at all time points under elevated temperature, the Genencor products still infringed because the retained higher activity than wild type at all times after exposing the proteins to high temperature.

Another claim term, which the court spent a lot of time was "isolated." Novozymes argued that "isolated" was not a limitation on the claim scope because it is part of the claims’ preamble. The district court spent some time considering this argument, but ultimately sided with Genencor and held that "isolated" does limit the scope of the claim. In part, it reached this decision because "isolated" did not appear in the claim originally but was introduced during prosecution of the patent application, which the court found implied that the term "isolated" was significant.

The parties disputed the meaning of the term “isolated,” with Novozymes arguing for a broad interpretation that would cover protein existing at a higher concentration in a cell or cell extract than it would naturally, while Genencor argued for a narrower interpretation in which the protein must to some extent be separated from other cellular components. The court adopted the narrower interpretation, but nonetheless found that most Genencor products infringed because they included isolated protein. However, the court did find that some Genencor products are not infringing in which the thermostable alpha-amylase is not separated from other cellular components, which the court referred to as "whole broth" products, because the protein is not isolated.

The proper interpretation of "isolated" in claims such as this has important implications for biotechnology patenting outside the confines of this particular case. For example, the patent office will not issue patents claiming naturally occurring gene sequences unless the claims specifically recite that the DNA molecule is isolated, purified, and/or recombinant, in order to exclude genes as they occur naturally (for example in the human genome). The assumption is that inclusion of the term "isolated" in the claim limits the scope of the claim. I don't think it is even accurate to consider the use of the term "isolated" in claims of this format as preamble, but in any event it should generally be treated as limiting the scope of the claim.

Furthermore, the scope of the term isolated is important in the context of gene patent. As I have discussed elsewhere, the question of whether genetic diagnostic testing or whole genome sequencing infringes gene patents could in many cases dependent on how broadly a court interprets the term isolated in these claims (I have always assumed that "isolated" is a meaningful limitation on claim scope in this context).

In this case, the prosecution history was apparently silent as to why Novozymes amended the claim to include the "isolated" language. It would not seem to be necessarily required in this case if the claim only covers non-naturally occurring variants, because then there would be no danger of the claim reading on a naturally occurring biomolecule. But perhaps Novozymes intended for the claim to cover naturally occurring thermostable variants, in which case limiting the claim to isolated variants would be necessary in order for the claim to be valid.

In any event, the fact that "isolated" was introduced by amendment was significant, because it led the court to rule that under Festo the term could not be expanded beyond its literal scope under the doctrine of equivalents.

Thanks to Docket Navigator for bringing this decision to my attention.

Monday, July 11, 2011

PTO Agrees to Reexamine Broad Codon-Optimization Patents

Many important applications of biotechnology involve the expression of recombinant genes in heterologous systems. Since the genetic code is degenerate (ie each amino acid can be coded by on average three different codons), the DNA sequence can be modified by synonymous nucleotide substitutions without altering the amino acid sequence of the encoded protein. A biotechnologist might find it useful to make a synonymous substitution for any of a variety of reasons, e.g., to introduce or remove restriction sites, or to remove repeats.

Today genes are also often altered for the specific purpose of optimizing expression, i.e., the entire coding region of the gene is recoded to fit one of a variety of codon optimization schemes. Examples of popular codon optimization schemes used in designing a gene for recombinant expression include:

A) Replace a degenerate codon with the most common codon present in the host chromosome; the rationale being that the most common codon correspond to the most common tRNA results in most protein yield.

B) Reengineer the gene so that it uses the same frequency of codons that are present in the host chromosome; the rationale being that the recombinant gene should have the same codon bias as the host chromosome to fit the translational machinery.

C) Re-code the pattern of rare and common codons found in the wild type by replacing it with the corresponding rare/common codons in the heterologous host; the rationale being that protein folding and expression requires rare (slow) and common (fast) codons distributed according to the folding domains in the protein.

D) Empirically identify codons and other variables that correlate with high protein expression in a systematically varied recombinant gene.

Codon optimization has become standard practice in the recombinant expression of heterologous proteins such as biologic drugs. Gene synthesis companies such as DNA2.0 and Blue Heron assist their customers by providing codon optimization as a part of their services.

Two U.S. patents (both assigned to the Massachusetts General Hospital) include claims directed towards codon optimization, both the method and the resulting codon-optimized gene (US Patent Numbers 5,786,464 and 6,114,148). These patents are very broad, purporting to cover any "synthetic gene encoding a protein normally expressed in an eukaryotic cell wherein at least one non-preferred or less preferred codon . . . has been replaced by a preferred codon encoding the same amino acid, [and wherein the replacement results in at least 10% increase in the level of protein expressed] in an in vitro mammalian cell culture system under identical conditions”

These patents appear to not only cover any successfully codon-optimized recombinant gene, but also many genes that have been reengineered for purposes other than codon optimization. For example, a silent mutation introduced for the purpose of removing a restriction site could easily constitute infringement if it results in the introduction of any of the 17 codons identified in the patent as “preferred,” if it turns out that the substitution results in a modest 10% increase in expression in any in vitro mammalian cell culture system. Rarely would an experimenter test for such an increase in expression at that level of accuracy, and a practical matter it would be virtually impossible to rule out the possibility of a 10% increase in expression in some mammalian cell culture system.

In view of their scope, and the pervasive use of codon replacement in the expression of high-value heterologous proteins (such as biologic drugs), these patents could potentially have sweeping implications for biotechnology. However, although the patents issued in 1998 and 2000, they have never been asserted in court and until recently appear to have received little attention.

However, the patents have recently become a thorny issue for those involved in the business of expressing heterologous proteins, particularly gene synthesis companies providing codon optimized genes for their customers. Last year Geneart (a German gene synthesis company owned by Life Technologies) began sending letters to companies engaged in the expression of heterologous proteins announcing that "we are very pleased to inform you that Geneart has acquired a license under [the Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) Patents].” The letter goes on to state that under the license “Geneart is in the excellent position to offer a broad range of sublicensing opportunities." The licensing “opportunities” include a royalty-free sublicense to use synthetic genes purchased from Geneart in internal R&D, and a royalty-bearing commercial sublicense for synthetic genes used for purposes other than internal research and development. According to the letter, Geneart has executed a non-prosecution agreement with respect to synthetic genes delivered by Geneart to customers prior to May 30, 2010, so these customers are apparently free to use the genes in any manner without liability for infringement.

The letter goes on to imply that customers who choose to purchase synthetic genes from competing gene synthesis companies could be sued for infringing the MGH Patents, stating that "to Geneart’s knowledge, no other Gene Synthesis Service Provider has obtained a respective license under the MGH Patents."

This poses a problem for any biotechnologist wishing to use a synthetic or partially modified gene. Even slight variations to the wild-type sequence, such as restriction site removal or addition, could infringe.
It certainly poses a problem to other synthetic gene companies, whose customers might switch to Geneart in order to avoid a perceived threat of patent infringement liability for using synthetic genes not purchased from Geneart.


DNA2.0, a leading provider of synthetic genes headquartered in Menlo Park California, has responded to this perceived threat by successfully petitioning for reexamination of both patents, arguing that the broad claims are anticipated and/or rendered obvious by prior art not previously considered by the PTO. The orders granting the ex parte reexamination of the ‘148 and ‘464 patents were issued on December 14, 2010 and January 26, 2011, respectively.

The orders granting reexamination state that a number of references cited by DNA2.0 in the request for reexamination raise substantial new questions of patentability with respect to most of the claims in the patents, particularly the broadest claims. For example, an article published in the Journal of Virology in 1992 by Schwartz et al. describes the characterization of inhibitory RNA elements in the gag region of human immunodeficiency virus type I (HIV-1). This involved replacing many of the codons in the wild type gene with synonymous codons defined as "preferred" in the MGH Patents, resulting in at least a five-fold increase in expression. As another example, the PTO found an article disclosing a computer program for optimizing DNA sequences for protein expression, in combination with another article disclosing the most frequent human codon usage together with preferred codon choice patterns, also raise substantial new questions of patentability for many of the claims.

It is interesting to note that the corresponding codon optimization patent issued to MGH in Europe (EP 0 781 329 B2) is much narrower in scope, claiming a method for preparing a synthetic gene wherein at least 50% of the non-preferred codons and less preferred codons are replaced by preferred codons and resulting in a 10% increase in expression. In contrast, the US patents purport to claim any method that involves replacing even one codon with a preferred codon, and any gene made by such a process.

It is my understanding that, as a practical matter, the European patent only poses a substantial impediment to the “A” form of codon optimization described above, i.e., replacement of all degenerate codons with the most common codon present in the host chromosome. Most other codon optimizations do not require the substitution of 50% of non- or less preferred codons. In contrast, the U.S. patents would appear to cover the majority of recombinant protein expression that has been done in recent years. The patents should expire 2015, but the pending reexamination could be important if it results in cancellation or narrowing of the claims in the US patents, thereby providing assurance that companies will not be sued for expressing recombinant proteins prior to patent expiration.

Wednesday, June 1, 2011

Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association Et al. v. Monsanto: The Public Patent Foundation Takes on Agricultural Biotechnology

The Public Patent Foundation (PubPat), housed at the Cardozo School of Law in New York, is probably best known to readers of this blog for its role in the challenge to Myriad gene patents in AMP v. PTO (PubPat is co-counsel, along with the ACLU). PubPat has brought a number of other "public interest" actions against other patents, including reexamination of some of the key University of Wisconsin embryonic stem cell patents.

On March 29 PubPat took on agricultural biotechnology, filing a declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of New York against Monsanto, on behalf of a large contingent of plaintiffs, including agricultural member organizations, farms and farmers, and seed companies. The plaintiffs are primarily, but not entirely, organic, and all have purportedly have disavowed the use of genetically modified seed.

The primary contention of the plaintiffs is that they "are increasingly being threatened by transgenic seed contamination despite using their best efforts to avoid it." The allege that Monsanto "has aggressively asserted [its patents] against literally hundreds of farmers, including those farmers who became contaminated by Monsanto's transgenic seed through no fault of their own." They have asked the court to declare a long list of Monsanto patents invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed, and that Monsanto would not be entitled to any remedies against the plaintiffs even if found to infringe a valid and enforceable patent.

Interestingly, I was talking with someone who works for Monsanto recently and he mentioned that to his knowledge the complaint had never been served upon Monsanto. I checked PACER on June 1, and the docket indicates that PubPat has yet to file notice that the complaint was served on Monsanto, even though the complaint was filed more than two months ago (March 29). For comparison, in the Myriad case notice of service on the plaintiffs was filed within one month after the complaint was filed.

Do the Plaintiffs Have Standing?

Perhaps the biggest stumbling block for PubPat will be establishing that any of the plaintiffs have standing to bring suit (a big issue in the Myriad lawsuit). The standing of the plaintiffs seems even more problematic in this case, since the plaintiffs all avow that they are doing everything they can to avoid infringing Monsanto's patent, and there appears to be no evidence that Monsanto has ever filed suit against an involuntary/inadvertent infringer. The complaint filed by PubPat makes this allegation, but does not document a single example of a case where a party was sued for infringement that was involuntary. The closest it comes is a reference to a 2008 segment of the CBS Evening News, which the complaint alleges described an incident in which farmers (Mr. and Mrs. Runyon), "who never intended to use transgenic seeds," were threatened with a patent infringement suit (but apparently never sued).

The complaint also alleges that Monsanto has litigated patent infringement claims against other farmers who did not want to be contaminated by transgenic seeds, including notably Percy Schmeiser. Schmeiser has become something of a folk hero, a Canadian farmer who was sued by Monsanto for patent infringement in a case that was eventually decided by the Canadian Supreme Court. Critics of Monsanto in the popular media routinely point to Schmeiser as an example of a honest Canadian farmer sued by corporate villain Monsanto for patent infringement that was completely involuntary and inadvertent, while failing to note that the Canadian courts found unambiguously that Schmeiser’s infringement was in fact voluntary, and that he went out of his way to collect and plant transgenic seed incorporating the patented Monsanto trait. Here are some excerpts from the Canadian Supreme Court decision [Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2004 SCC 34, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902]:

The remaining question was how such a pure concentration of Roundup Ready Canola came to grow on the appellants’ land in 1998. The trial judge rejected the suggestion that it was the product of seed blown or inadvertently carried onto the appellants’ land . . .

Invoking the concepts of implied licence and waiver, the appellants argue that this Court should grant an exemption from infringement to “innocent bystanders”. The simple answer to this contention is that on the facts found by the trial judge, Mr. Schmeiser was not an innocent bystander; rather, he actively cultivated Roundup Ready Canola.
Given the issues of standing, one has to wonder why PubPat has chosen the declaratory judgment route to challenge Monsanto's patents. After all, PubPat asserts that Monsanto has aggressively asserted its patents against "literally hundreds of farmers," including farmers whose only offense was to have their crops contaminated by Monsanto's seed. In the Myriad case, the ACLU and PubPat were forced to assemble a group of plaintiffs and file a declaratory judgment action, because for years Myriad has disappointed its critics by never suing anyone for infringing its gene patents. But that is not the case with Monsanto, which I believe has filed patent infringement suits against farms numbering in the hundreds.

Why isn't PubPat defending one of these farmers that has already been sued? This would give PubPat the opportunity to challenge the Monsanto's patents, without any issue of standing. Perhaps they find it is preferable to conduct "public interest litigation" on behalf of recruited plaintiffs rather than actual defendants potentially liable for damages.

In fact, at least one farmer is currently before the Federal Circuit arguing one of the legal theories raised in the PubPat complaint, i.e., that "Monsanto's patent rights in transgenic seed exhaust upon the authorized distribution by Monsanto to its customers." In 2009, a district court in the Southern District of Indiana rejected this very argument in Monsanto v. Bowman, citing earlier Federal Circuit decisions in Monsanto v. Scruggs and Monsanto v. McFarling. Mr. Bowman argued unsuccessfully that he should not be held liable for infringement based on the use of "commodity" soybean seed he had purchased and that inadvertently included seed containing the patented Roundup Ready trait. The district court decision indicates that Mr. Bowman argued the case as a pro se defendant, but the appeal briefs being filed with the Federal Circuit this year indicate that he is currently being represented by Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP.

Below, I briefly address some of the arguments raised in the PubPat complaint, including moral utility, exhaustion and inadvertent infringement.

Moral Utility

Historically, US law had a doctrine of moral utility, under which a patent could be found invalid if the claimed invention lacks sufficient social or moral use. The doctrine traces its origin to a statement by Justice Story in the 1817 Lowell v. Lewis decision to the effect that inventions that are "injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society" are unpatentable. Examples provided by Justice Story included "a new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private assassination."

Although technically still on the books, the doctrine of moral utility has generally been considered moribund in the US since the 1999 Federal Circuit decision in Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, which essentially held that patent law is not the appropriate legal vehicle for addressing questions of morality. I think this is the proper approach. For example, I would rather not have the patent office deciding whether or not a gambling invention is patentable based on the morality or social utility of gambling. A patent does not confer any positive right to practice in invention, only the right to exclude others from practicing it, so the patent would in no way shields the patent owner from anti-gambling laws, which is the more appropriate way to address morality or social concerns associated with gambling.

European patent law, on the other hand, explicitly provides that inventions that are "immoral and against the public order" are patent ineligible. The European High Court is currently considering a case challenging the patent eligibility of embryonic stem cells based on allegations that the use of viable human embryos in the industrial process of producing cultured embryonic stem cells is immoral. The Court's advocate general has in fact put forth such a position, as discussed recently on the Patent Docs blog.

I cannot imagine PubPat prevailing on this theory. The doctrine of moral utility has generally been considered pretty much irrelevant after Juicy Whip, but even if the doctrine still has some teeth, there is a wealth of data supporting the benefits of transgenic crops, which explains why they have been so widely adopted in the US, and increasingly throughout the world. The PubPat complaint goes to great lengths reciting a host of alleged evils of agricultural biotechnology, and asserts that transgenic crops have failed to provide any benefits, citing authorities such as England's Prince Charles, but I think this flies in the face of a wealth of evidence going the other direction.

Patent Exhaustion

As mentioned above, PubPat alleges that Monsanto's patent rights in transgenic seeds are exhausted by their first authorized sale, presumably relying on the Supreme Court's 2009 Quanta decision. This was one of the main concerns that I raised regarding Quanta, i.e., the potential for the decision to preclude the ability of biotechnology companies to adequately enforce patents covering products capable of self-replication.

Prior to the Supreme Court deciding Quanta, the Federal Circuit held in Monsanto v. Scruggs (2006) that patent exhaustion did not shield from infringement liability a farmer who saved and replanted patented seeds without Monsanto's authorization because (1) the initial sale from Monsanto was not an “unrestricted sale” and (2) the second generation of seeds were never “sold.” Scruggs filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was denied. The case was remanded to the district court, where Scruggs moved for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Quanta. The district court denied the motion, but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit, to resolve the question of whether the Federal Circuit's decision regarding patent exhaustion in Monsanto v. Scruggs was still good law in view of Quanta. But in 2009 the Federal Circuit exercised its discretion and declined to decide the interlocutory appeal, advising Scruggs to appeal the issue after the district court issues a final decision or injunction.

Thus, the question of whether the Federal Circuit decision in Monsanto v. Scruggs regarding patent exhaustion of transgenic seeds survives Quanta has yet to be resolved. The Federal Circuit could address the issue in Monsanto v. Bowman, or perhaps in the PubPat lawsuit if it goes forward.

Inadvertent Infringement

At a doctrinal level, for me perhaps the most interesting argument raised by PubPat is that the plaintiffs are not liable for infringement because any infringement would be involuntary and inadvertent, the result of contamination by transgenic seed used by other farmers. To my knowledge, this issue has never been directly addressed by the courts, and as a practical matter I doubt that Monsanto has sued farmers for legitimate good-faith but inadvertent infringement. As noted above, the PubPat complaint does not appear to identify any specific occurrence of this, and the widely propagated story that Schmeiser was a good-faith inadvertent infringer is contrary to the findings of the Canadian courts.

But how would a court deal with involuntary and inadvertent infringement if the issue ever did arise? It is well-established that, as a general matter, patent infringement is a matter of strict liability, i.e., intent is not an element of patent infringement. However, I am convinced that a court faced with a true case of inadvertent infringement would find some doctrinal loophole to shield the alleged infringer from liability. However, there is to my knowledge no specific doctrinal defense addressing the issue.

For example, in Monsanto v. Schmeiser, the Canadian Supreme Court indicated that if Schmeiser’s infringement had been inadvertent he would not have been liable for infringement, because under such circumstances his mere possession of patented seeds would not lead to a presumption that he had "used" the seeds in an infringing manner.

In the US, the issue of inadvertent infringement was addressed in the fascinating case of SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 403 F.3d 1331 (2005), which involved allegations that a generic drug manufacturer would not be able to produce a non-infringing generic drug without inadvertently producing an infringing polymorph of the drug, thus involuntarily infringing the patent. At the district court level, the decision was written by Judge Posner, a famous judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation for this case as a district court judge. Judge Posner noted the policy concern attendant to holding an inadvertent infringer liable for patent infringement, and spent a great deal of time grappling with the question of how existing patent doctrine could be interpreted in a manner to arrive at the outcome, i.e. no liability for inadvertent infringement.

Here is an excerpt from Judge Posner's opinion in SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 247 F.Supp.2d 1011 (2003):

The reason for excusing the alleged infringement in this case is not that Apotex stole only a little hemihydrate from SmithKline. It stole nothing from SmithKline. It doesn't want hemihydrate, and it derives no value from the hemihydrate that it unavoidably creates and “sells.” If it made hemihydrate deliberately, or if it took advantage of 100 percent conversion to obtain a product that had hemihydrate's superior handling characteristics, that would be theft and it would be nonsense to point out that paroxetine is only 10 percent of the pill by weight. But if the person sitting next to me at dinner spills his soup on my sleeve, I am not a thief even though I cannot remove the stain.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit rendered the question of inadvertent infringement moot by invalidating the SmithKline patent for inherent anticipation. However, in a concurring opinion Judge Gajarsa addressed the issue of inadvertent infringement, in a manner that would probably resonate with PubPat and other opponents of patents on transgenic seeds. Judge Gajarsa essentially advocated a position that the issue of inadvertent infringement could be dealt with in situations such as this by recognizing that any product capable of being "spread and reproduced by natural processes" is patent ineligible under 35 USC 101. I think this assertion is incorrect, and would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which explicitly found genetically modified living organisms to be patent eligible.

Nevertheless, here are some excerpts from Judge Gajarsa’s concurrence:

The asserted breadth of Claim 1 makes sense only under the erroneous belief that patents may protect products spread and reproduced by natural processes, directly contradicting our well established understanding of the limits imposed by section 101. Given current scientific trends, such a belief could easily lead to misdirected research investments, to inappropriately issued patents, and to a widespread in terrorem effect crippling entire industries whose artisans learn that even their best efforts to respect patent rights may not save them from liability as inadvertent, inevitable infringers. As the district court recognized, the notice function of patents is meaningless in such an environment, SK II, 247 F.Supp.2d at 1028. The lack of suitable notice could easily chill innovation, inquiry, experimentation, and commercial development. The patent law does not sanction the concept of inevitable infringement.
. . .

Consider, for example, what might happen if the wind blew fertile, genetically modified blue corn protected by a patent, from the field of a single farmer into neighboring cornfields. The harvest from those fields would soon contain at least some patented blue corn mixed in with the traditional public domain yellow corn-thereby infringing the patent. The wind would continue to blow, and the patented crops would spread throughout the continent, thereby turning most (if not all) North American corn farmers into unintentional, yet inevitable, infringers.FN7 The implication-that the patent owner would be entitled to collect royalties from every farmer whose cornfields contained even a few patented blue stalks-cannot possibly be correct. The underlying question that engaged the district court, and that led it to develop numerous alternative holdings, is why this implication is incorrect.

FN7. Although intent is not a factor in determining infringement, public notice is required as a predicate to the validity of a patent. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1996). The hypothetical causes unavoidable infringement even in situations where the public would, in good faith, want to avoid infringing.

At oral argument, when faced with this hypothetical, SKB expressed its belief that such a blue-corn patent would be “very strong.” Such a belief is misplaced. The implicit concept of “inevitable infringement” stems from the inevitable failure of the patent to provide public notice-which, in turn, stems from the inherently unpatentable nature of the claimed subject matter.

This section 101 problem therefore brings us full circle, back to the impossibility of public notice. Under normal circumstances, inventors other than the patentee will understand how to avoid infringing a patent by avoiding the claimed product. Because products, such as our hypothetical blue corn or SKB's paroxetine hemihydrate, that can be “made” through a natural process of spontaneous conversion imply inevitable infringement, no combination of claim language and written description could possibly teach even one skilled in the art how to avoid infringement. It is unsurprising that a requirement considered so trivial for most patentable products that we are content to let it remain implicit, namely a lesson in infringement avoidance, is effectively impossible for subject matter unpatentable under section 101. In short, patent claims drawn broadly enough to encompass products that spread, appear, and “reproduce” through natural processes cover subject matter unpatentable under section 101-and are therefore invalid.

It will be interesting to see how the PubPat challenge to Monsanto, and the patenting of Arab cultural biotechnology in general, plays out.

Saturday, May 28, 2011

Therasense v. Becton Dickinson: Rethinking the Status of Patents as Technical Documents

Earlier this week the Federal Circuit issued its en banc decision in Therasense v. Becton Dickinson, which essentially made it more difficult to establish inequitable conduct. The decision has been reported and analyzed widely over the Internet, for example on the Patently-O and Patent Docs blogs. This post discusses one aspect of the case I find interesting, which is the problems that can occur when the PTO and courts unjustifiably assume that "legalese" statements appearing in patents constitute technical disclosures. To illustrate, let me begin by summarizing how Therasense (now Abbott Diabetes Care, and referred to in the decision and in this post simply as Abbott) got into trouble in the first place.

Abbott owns US patent number 4,545,382 (the ‘382 patent), which issued in 1985 and is directed towards a sensor comprising an electrode with enzyme bound to its external surface. In the specification, the ‘382 patent includes the following sentence (referred to herein as the "Sentence") which was the root cause of Abbott's alleged inequitable conduct: "Optionally, but preferably when being used on live blood, a protective membrane surrounds both the enzyme and the mediator layers, permeable to water and glucose molecules."

The Sentence refers to a protective membrane, employed to protect the electrode from being "fouled" by components of whole blood, such as red blood cells. As discussed later, it is Abbott's contention that at that time, as a practical matter, one of skill in the art would have considered it necessary to employ such a protective membrane when using the electrode in a whole blood. Nevertheless, as is typical practice in the drafting of patents, whoever drafted the patent (presumably a patent attorney or agent) identified the protective membrane as "optional but preferable" rather than mandatory. This is quite reasonable, in view of all the cases in which patentees have found their rights limited by unnecessarily limiting language appearing in the patent specification. The patent attorney prudently sought to avoid an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the scope of the claimed invention, in case it turned out to be possible to practice the invention without a protective membrane. When understood in this context, note that the "optional but preferable" language should not be interpreted as a technical disclosure that use of the electrode in live blood without a protective membrane would have been enabled at the time.

Abbott also prosecuted a counterpart to the ‘382 patent in Europe, containing the same "optionally, but preferably" language. The European Patent Office (EPO) cited as prior art against the application a German reference which required the use of a diffusion-limiting membrane. It is important to recognize that a diffusion-limiting membrane serves a very different purpose than a protective membrane. A diffusion-limiting membrane is used to slow the flow of glucose to the electrode, which was necessary for earlier electrodes that could not deal with a rapid influx of glucose, not to protect the electrode fouling.

In order to distinguish over the German reference, Abbott argued that the membrane mentioned in its patent application is a protective membrane, not a diffusion-limiting membrane. Abbott pointed out that the Sentence specifically notes that the protective membrane must be permeable to glucose molecules, and hence not diffusion-limiting as the membrane in the German reference. The arguments submitted by Abbott to the EPO characterized the protective membrane in their application as optional, parroting the language of the Sentence, but this was really tangential to the argument they were making, which was based on the distinction between protective and diffusion-limiting membranes. Unfortunately for Abbott, the briefs submitted to the EPO in 1994 and 1995 included representations that would come back to haunt them in the US, such as "[i]t is submitted that this disclosure [i.e., the Sentence] is unequivocally clear. The protective membrane is optional . . ..”

A few years later, in 1997, Abbott was prosecuting a different patent application in the US patent office that included claims directed to a sensor that did not require a protective membrane when used in whole blood. The ‘382 patent was cited by the PTO as prior art. To overcome the rejection, Abbott argued that one of skill in the art at the relevant time would have felt that the sensor disclosed in the ‘382 patent required the use of a membrane, notwithstanding the "optionally, but preferably" language appearing in the ‘382 patent specification.

In response to an examiner’s request for evidentiary support, Abbott submitted a declaration by Abbott's Director of Research and Development (Dr. Sanghera) stating that "one skilled in the art would not read [the Sentence] to teach that the use of a protective membrane with a whole blood sample is optionally or merely preferred." In submitting the affidavit, Abbott's patent attorney (Lawrence Pope) represented that "one skilled in the art would not . . . have read the "optionally, but preferably" language . . . as a technical teaching but rather mere patent phraseology." [Emphasis added]

In other words, Abbott argued that the "optionally, but preferably" language did not represent a technical disclosure of the state-of-the-art, but rather was an example of patent legalese inserted by the patent after to avoid unnecessarily limiting the scope of the patented invention. Note that there's nothing wrong with this, it is quite proper under some circumstances for an inventor to obtain patent claims that cover embodiments of her invention that employ after-arising technologies that were not part of the prior art at the time the patent application was filed.

In the declaration and accompanying argument apparently worked, and the application issued as US patent number 5,820,551, (the ‘551 patent), the patent that was ultimately held to be unenforceable for inequitable conduct by the district court based on Abbott's failure to disclose to the PTO the briefs filed to the EPO. The district court was evidently bothered by the appearance that in one forum, to suit its purposes, Abbott asserted that the term “optionally” is mere "patent phraseology" which in fact means "necessarily," while in a different forum it appeared to have argued that the same language is "unequivocally clear," i.e., "optionally" actually means "optionally."

In my view, the representations made to the US and European patent offices are not necessarily inconsistent. The problem is, the district court assumed that the "optional but preferable" language appearing in the patent is a technical disclosure, which it interpreted as a disclosure that one of skill in the art would have been able to use the electrode without a protective membrane. In fact, the language is better understood as patent legalese, or in the words of Abbott's attorney "patent phraseology," not intended as a technical disclosure but as language introduced into the specification to avoid unnecessarily limiting the scope of the patented invention.

The declaration and arguments made to the US PTO essentially made this point, and argued that one of skill in the art would have recognized this as patent legalese rather than a technical disclosure of the state-of-the-art. Before the EPO, Abbott does not appear to have argued that the state-of-the-art would have allowed the use of the electrode without a protective membrane, which is tangential to the argument it did make, which was based on the distinction between protective and diffusion-limiting membranes. Abbott's briefs to the EPO merely parroted the “optionally” language of the specification to make it clear that as a legal matter, Abbott did not intend to disclaim patent protection for electrodes used without a protective membrane, on the eventuality that this might become feasible someday.

In this case, Abbott was faced with a rejection based on patent legalese appearing in one of its own patents. But this sort of thing happens all the time, and often the patent cited as prior art is owned by a third party. In prosecuting patent applications, I have on numerous occasions been frustrated by the patent legalese appearing in patents asserted by examiners as prior art. These patents often include disclosure that is clearly wrong as a technical matter, and evidently was introduced into the patent specification by the patent drafter, but it can be difficult convincing a patent examiner that the disclosure appearing in a patent is inaccurate or not enabled. This is essentially the situation in which Abbott found itself, which required it to submit a declaration to the effect that a facially clear statement that use of a protective membrane is "optional” is inaccurate as a technical matter, and should be dismissed as mere patent phraseology.

Formally, the law treats a patent as a technical document. By statute, the patent specification is supposed to be directed towards a technical audience, i.e., the ubiquitous "person having ordinary skill in the art.” Federal Circuit case law attributes a higher degree of credibility to technical disclosure appearing in US patents than it does to other technical documents, such as peer reviewed journal articles. The Federal Circuit has held that the disclosure appearing in patents is presumptively enabled, apparently based on the rationale that the patent office has examined the patent for compliance with the enablement requirement. Other technical documents, such as articles appearing in technical journals, do not receive the same presumption of enablement.

I am quite skeptical with regard to this presumption favoring the credibility of patents over other technical documents. For one thing, patent examiners are charged with examining the enablement of patent claims, not the specification as a whole, which is a very different thing. The fact that a patent issues in no way implies that a patent examiner has reviewed all of the disclosure in a patent and found it to be technically accurate. As exemplified by the Abbott patent, much of the language appearing in patents is "patent phraseology," introduced by the patent practitioner drafting the patent to achieve certain legal objectives, such as broad scope of protection, or the ability to amend the claims a later date, rather than to provide the most accurate technical disclosure. Some patent attorneys might even disclose hypothetical embodiments simply to create prior art, essentially poisoning the well to prevent others from patenting around their invention. It is quite easy for a patent attorney to come up with hypothetical embodiments and describe them in the specification, and usually little downside to the practice (although it did come back to haunt Abbott in this case). It seems to me that the disclosure appearing in a peer-reviewed journal is much more likely to accurately describe the state-of-the-art than a patent, and that the Federal Circuit's presumption in favor of patents has gotten things backwards.

In fact, I would assert that patent law should recognize the reality that much of the disclosure appearing in patents is not technical in nature, but rather patent legalese introduced into the application by patent practitioners for purposes other than accurately describing the state of technology. In my experience, most scientists and other technical people are well aware of this, and recognize that much of what appears in patents is patent phraseology rather than an accurate and objective disclosure of technology. Patent law would do well if it would acknowledge that patents are often drafted for the primary purpose of furthering the legal and business objectives of the patent owner, not as true technical documents.

Wednesday, May 4, 2011

Billups-Rothenberg v. ARUP: Genetic Testing Patents Found to Be Anticipated and in Violation of Lilly Written Description Requirement

Robert Cook-Deegan and I filed an amicus brief in AMP v. US PTO (the Myriad gene patent case) essentially arguing that with respect to gene patents we should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. Some gene patents do appear overly broad and/or overly reaching, particularly in the context of genetic diagnostic testing, but these problematic patents are best addressed by means other than declaring all gene patents patent ineligible, which could have a substantial detrimental effect on biotechnology. For example, we pointed out that other doctrines of patentability, particularly the disclosure requirements of section 112 (written description and enablement) and the requirements of novelty and nonobviousness should be sufficient to address many if not all of the concerns associated with some gene patents. In Billups-Rothenberg v. ARUP, the Federal Circuit has just provided an illustration of what we were talking about, invalidating all of the gene patent claims that have been asserted against companies providing genetic diagnostic testing for mutations in the HFE gene, which are associated with hereditary hemochromatosis.

Gene patents have become quite controversial, based largely on a perception that they impose undue restrictions on the development and availability of genetic diagnostic testing. I have argued that the concerns have been overblown, in part because they assume that gene patent claims are extremely broad in scope (and thus difficult if not impossible to design around), when in fact if interpreted as broadly the claims would be highly susceptible to invalidation under a variety of patentability doctrines. Unfortunately, human gene patents have rarely been litigated in the context of genetic testing, there has been little case law to point to directly on point, and critics of gene patents have assumed the worst.

In fact, in a comprehensive survey of human gene patent litigation in the United States that I conducted in 2007, I found only a handful of lawsuits that had been filed asserting infringement of a human gene patent by a provider of genetic diagnostic testing services, and no substantive judicial decisions arising out of any of these lawsuits, owing to the fact that they all settled shortly after the lawsuit was filed. The Billups-Rothenberg lawsuit was filed shortly after I conducted my survey, and to my knowledge represents the only case in which the courts have actually reached a decision concerning an allegation that a human gene patent was infringed by genetic testing (in the Myriad case, Myriad has not alleged that any of the plaintiffs are infringing its patents)- it is certainly the first time the Federal Circuit has addressed the issue. Consistent with the point we were attempting to make in our amicus brief, the Federal Circuit invalidated the asserted human gene patents for violation of the written description requirement and for lack of novelty. This is a precedential opinion, and I think quite informative as to how the courts will address human gene patents that appear to claim more than was justified by the nature of the inventor's discovery.

Written Description
The asserted claims of US patent 5,674,681 were all held to be invalid for violation of the written description requirement. Claim 2 is representative:
2. A method to identify an individual having or predisposed to having hemochromatosis, comprising the steps of:
providing from the individual a sample containing a gene encoding a nonclassical MHC class I heavy chain and

detecting a mutation in said gene, which mutation results in the reduced ability of said heavy chain to associate with said β2 microglobulin, wherein the presence of said mutation identifies said individual as having or predisposed to having hemochromatosis.

As a sidenote, note that this claim explicitly requires providing a patient sample, and thus would only be infringed by an entity that obtained a physical DNA sample from a patient and analyzed it to detect a mutation in the gene. This sort of limitation appears in most gene patent claims, and is increasingly significant as we move toward whole genome sequencing, since it implies that these sorts of claims will not be infringed in situations where one entity sequences a patient's genome and another entity (for example a doctor) analyzes the genetic data disease-related mutations. On the other hand, the Federal Circuit's recent decision in Prometheus makes clear that a patent claim that could be infringed by merely analyzing genetic data, without physically manipulating DNA molecules, would be invalid based on patent ineligibility. This is part of the reason I believe that gene patents will become less of an issue as personal whole genome sequencing becomes established, and the analysis of DNA molecules becomes decoupled from the analysis of genetic information.

Like most written description decisions coming out of the Federal Circuit, the court is not entirely clear as to exactly why the claims failed the written description requirement, but I see two distinct bases before the court's decision. First, the court found that the specification does not demonstrate possession of the claimed subject matter, and that the inventors had "attempted to preempt the future before has arrived." In other words, the court invoked Lilly written description as a doctrinal "wildcard" (using the language of Judge Rader) to invalidate an "unworthy" patent claim, along the lines seen in cases such as Ariad and Rochester.

The court also based its decision on the failure of the patent to disclose the DNA sequence of the gene recited in the claims, citing Regents of UC v. Lilly and Fiers v. Revel. The patent discloses the general location of the gene in the human genome, but not its exact location, nor its DNA sequence, nor the sequence of any mutations.

The court made the important observation that "this case is like Regents and Fiers, in which the DNA sequences at issue were unknown in the art.” Prior to the Federal Circuit's 2008 decision in Carnegie Mellon v. Hoffman-La Roche, it was my opinion that the only way to reconcile Federal Circuit decisions which invalidated patent claims under Lilly written description for failure to provide DNA sequence information from decisions that upheld the validity of claims failing to provide DNA sequence information was the distinction between previously known and unknown DNA sequences. If the heart of the claimed invention involved identification of a novel DNA sequence (Fiers, Regents of UC, In re Wallach, In re Kubin (a rare precedential BPAI decision), a strict interpretation of Lilly written description has been applied requiring adequate disclosure of DNA sequence. On the other hand, in cases where the heart of the invention involves a novel recombination or modification of a previously known DNA sequence, the court has not required to disclosure of DNA sequence (Amgen v. HMR, Capon v. Eshhar, Invitrogen v. Clontech, and Falko_Gunter Falkner v. Inglis).

In Carnegie Mellon v. Hoffman-La Roche, Roche made the entirely legitimate argument that Lilly written description only requires disclosure of DNA sequence in cases where the invention involves the discovery of a new gene sequence. Since the heart of the claimed invention in that case involved a novel recombination of genetic elements, not the discovery of a new genetic sequence, Roche argued (correctly in my view) that a disclosure of DNA sequence was not necessary to satisfy Lilly written description. But the Federal Circuit rejected Roche's argument, and specifically held that the requirement for compliance with Lilly written description is the same regardless of whether or not an invention is based upon discovery of the new genetic sequence. I thought this was a poor decision, because without that distinction I don't know how you make sense of the disparate outcomes in the previous Federal Circuit written description decisions.

In Centocor, decided earlier this year, the Federal Circuit explicitly held that the requirement for compliance with Lilly written description does depend upon whether or not invention involves a newly discovered molecule. I would say this was the only way it could reconcile its decision to invalidate Centocor's antibody claim for failure to provide adequate disclosure of structure, while running into direct conflict with Noelle v. Lederman, which held that a broad claim directed to antibodies can comply with Lilly written description in the absence of any structural description. Of course, this seems irreconcilable with the court’s statement in Carnegie Mellon that it is irrelevant whether or not the invention involves discovery of a new molecule.

The decision in Billups-Rothenberg adopts the Centocor approach, by emphasizing the distinction between claims directed towards DNA sequences known in the art versus other claims directed towards DNA. I think this distinction is critical in any attempt to reconcile Federal Circuit decisions involving Lilly written description, with the caveat that the Carnegie Mellon University decision is an outlier.

The Billups-Rothenberg decision is I think also illustrates how courts can use the written description requirement to invalidate gene patent claims that seem to be overreaching. For example, even if the patent had disclosed the gene sequence, I can imagine a court invalidating a claim broadly directed towards methods of identifying mutations in the gene for failure to satisfy Lilly written description, because the specification fails to evidence "possession" of all the mutations that might be linked to disease, and because the specification fails to identify the sequence of specific mutations linked to disease.

Novelty
The other patent asserted in the case, US patent number 6,355,425, was found to be invalid based on anticipation by one of the defendant’s patents, 6,025,130. The ‘425 patent claim the method for diagnosing hereditary hemochromatosis by determining the presence of a mutation in exon two of the HFE gene. The patent apparently covers diagnostic testing for the S65C mutation, which has been correlated with the hemochromatosis. The defendants test for this mutation.

The prior art ‘130 patent discloses the S65C mutation, but also states that presence of the mutation in patients "shows no increase in risk of acquiring [hereditary hemochromatosis] and thus may only be a polymorphic variant within the population." In other words, while the prior art patent apparently discloses testing for the S65C mutation, it also explicitly acknowledges that the inventors had not identified any basis to infer that identification of the mutation would be useful for diagnosing risk of hemochromatosis, and thus failed to disclose any practical utility for testing for the mutation.

Billups-Rothenberg argued that prior art disclosing only “a clinically insignificant polymorphism unrelated to disease” did not constitute an anticipatory reference to a claim directed towards a method of testing for the mutation in order to diagnose for disease risk. However, the court rejected this argument, and basically held that the mere disclosure of the mutation and a method of testing for it was sufficient, regardless of whether the reference disclosed a practical utility in testing for the mutation. The court also stressed that disclosure appearing in an issued patent is presumed to be enabled.

This aspect of the decision reminds me of In re Gleave, discussed in an earlier post. The approach adopted by the Federal Circuit in these decisions could have significant implications for the patentability of newly discovered genetic mutations. For example, suppose a researcher identifies a mutation in a known gene of clinical significance, such as correlation with disease. I can imagine a court extending the logic of Billups-Rothenberg and Gleave to conclude that a prior art patent disclosing the gene sequence, and perhaps stating that one could test the gene sequence for mutations, is anticipatory prior art, even though the patent does not disclose the mutations later discovered to be correlated with disease.