Friday, March 16, 2012

District Court Decision in Case Involving Centocor's IL-12 Antibody Stelara

In the 1990s Centocor and Abbott both developed human antibodies specific for interleukin 12 ("IL-12", a cytokine), and filed patent applications broadly claiming isolated antibodies that bind IL-12. Abbott's work has resulted in a pharmaceutical composition (briakinumab )that is currently in late stage clinical trials, and two US patents, (6,914,128 and 7,504,485). Centocor's has resulted in the FDA approved drug Stelara. In 2007 an interference was declared between Abbott's ‘128 patent and a pending Centocor patent application, and in 2009 the BPAI decided the interference in favor of Abbott.

Both companies’ antibody products bind to the P40 subunit of IL-12 (it was not clear to me from reading the decision whether the products bind to the same epitope, although I suspect they do not). The antibodies have substantially different amino acid sequences, and were developed independently using different methodologies.

Abbott has sued Centocor, seeking a declaration that Stelara infringes its ‘128 and ‘485 patents. Centocor has sued Abbott seeking a declaration that its product does not infringe the patents, and that the patents are invalid. Centocor has also petitioned the district court for judicial review of the interference decision pursuant to 35 USC 146. All three actions are currently pending before the District Court of Massachusetts.

On March 9, the District Court issued an order deciding multiple motions of summary judgment filed by both parties. Here is a quick summary of some of those decisions.

Issue Preclusion
Abbott filed a motion arguing that Centocor is precluded from raising invalidity of the ‘128 patent as a defense because it raised the issue during the interference and lost. The District Court denied this motion, based on its determination that the BPAI’s decision in the interference was not a "binding final judgment." The court found that under 35 USC 146 a party that loses the interference before the BPAI can seek a de novo trial in Federal District Court on validity issues previously decided by the BPAI, and thus the decision of the board cannot be a "binding final judgment" with preclusive effect in a subsequent infringement action.

Indefiniteness
A number of Abbott's claims define the claimed antibody in terms of the dissociation constant, or "Kd” value, for the interaction between the antibody and its target IL-12. Kd is a measure of the affinity of the antibody-antigen interaction, i.e., the strength with which the antibody binds, or attaches to, the antigen. Kd can be determined by measuring the rate constants at which the antibody attaches to and detaches from the antigen. One way of measuring these on and off rates is by use of a technique called surface plasmon resonance ("SPR"), using for example a BIAcore instrument. Abbott's patent specifications disclose that Kd can be determined by SPR using the BIACore System, and identify four scientific articles describing the process.

Centocor argued that the specification did not provide specific instructions that would permit a person reasonably skilled in the art to unambiguously determine the KD value of an antibody using SPR, and asked the court to rule the claims invalid for indefiniteness. Specifically, Centocor argued that SPR could yield different Kd values for the same antibody when tested using different experimental parameters. In particular, Centocor pointed out that the claims do not specify surface density or flow rate parameters.

The district court rejected this argument however. The court read Federal Circuit precedent as establishing that when multiple acceptable standards or methods exist for testing whether a product meets a claim limitation, the patent is indefinite if it does not specify the appropriate standard or method to be used. However, a claim is not indefinite when it does specify the method of measurement, even if it omits details about how to implement the method, so long as a person of ordinary skill could infer those details using industry standards or professional judgment. In this case, the court held that a person skilled in conducting SPR assays could determine the appropriate parameters and adequately discern the bounds of the Kd limitations.

The court found that Centocor had provided no expert testimony refuting Abbott's expert’s testimony that best practices take these parameters into account, and can provide reliable Kd data. The lack of rebuttal testimony probably was a factor in the District Court deciding the issue of definiteness in favor of Abbott on a motion for summary judgment.

The court also found it significant that many issued US patents claim include claims encompassing antibodies defined in terms of particular binding characteristics as measured by SPR, and none of these patents recite the specific experimental parameters for the SPR assays. Centocor itself is the named assignee on three such patents.

Written Description
The court denied Centocor's motion seeking summary judgment that certain claims in the patent are invalid for lack of adequate written description. All of the challenged claims are directed to genuses of functionally defined antibodies. Abbott conceded that its patents do not disclose common structural features for the claimed genuses.

According to the court, the sole issue with respect to adequate written description is whether the patents disclose species that constitute a representative set within each genus claim, reciting the ambiguous standard set forth in UC v. Eli Lilly and its progeny.

Abbott's patent specification discloses multiple antibodies falling within the scope of the claims, but Centocor argued that this disclosure was inadequate because all of the disclosed antibodies share very similar amino acid sequences, while the functionally defined claims would encompass a broad range of amino acid sequences. The high degree of sequence homology of the examples arises from the fact that they are all derived from a single common precursor antibody.

In contrast, Centocor's product Stelara originated from a different antibody, and different methodology, and has amino acid sequence that is substantially different from the set of examples disclosed in Abbott's patents. Centocor makes the not unreasonable argument that if Abbott's claims are broad enough to encompass Stelara, then they are too broad to be adequately represented by the group of highly similar antibodies disclosed in Abbott's patents.

However, the court found that compliance with the written description requirement, a question of fact, could not be decided on summary judgment. Significantly, the parties’ experts disputed the significance of the differences in amino acid sequence between the disclosed antibodies and the range of amino acid sequences encompassed by the claims.

It is interesting to compare the adequacy of written description in this case with the Federal Circuit's decision last year in Centocor v. Abbott, discussed here. Both cases involve the same parties and claims directed towards antibodies, but the earlier decision involved antibodies to human TNF-alpha. In the earlier decision, the Federal Circuit held the antibody claim at issue to be invalid for inadequate written description as a matter of law. The Federal Circuit’s decision seemed to hinge on the facts that the antigen (TNF-alpha) had been previously characterized, and the production of the claimed antibody "comprising a human constant region" was not routine. Both of those criteria seem to be satisfied in the current case involving IL-12 antibody. In distinguishing the Federal Circuit's decision in the earlier Centocor case, the district court pointed out that in the TNF-alpha case the specification did not describe a single antibody falling within the scope of the claim.

Prior Art
Centocor also asked the court to rule that Abbott's earlier work on IL-12 antibodies, and also Centocor's on Stelara, constitute 102(g) prior art with respect to Abbott's claims. The court denied these motions.

I found one aspect of the court's decision particularly interesting. The court assigned Centocor's invention of Stelara a priority date of April 30, 1998. Centocor pointed out that one of the inventors listed on the Abbott patents, Stuart Friedrich, was not employed by Abbott earlier than August 1998, and hence could not have contributed to Abbott's IL-12 research project before then. Centocor argued that the inclusion of Mr. Friedrich as a joint inventor proves the conception was not complete before August 1998.

The district court rejected this argument, however, stating that the proof of priority to a genus claim requires less than what is required to establish adequate written description of that claim. The court went on to conclude that "it is plausible that Abbott invented a species of pharmaceutical composition within the scope of this claims before Centocor's priority date of April 30, 1998, but nevertheless required contributions from Mr. Friedrich after that date in order to establish the patentability of Abbott's genus claims under 35 USC 112.”

In other words, the district court seems to be saying that an individual can be a joint inventor of a chemical genus even if he does not contribute to the conception of the genus, but only contributes to providing adequate disclosure to establish compliance with section 112. I don't know if there is any precedent to support this unconventional definition of joint inventorship - the District Court does not seem to cite to any.

Infringement
The court held some of Abbott's claims infringed by Stelara.

All of the claims include a limitation to "human antibody," and Centocor unsuccessfully argued that its product is not a human antibody as that term is properly construed in the claims. In particular, the court had construed "human antibody" to mean "an antibody that is derived from human DNA and not from the DNA of any non-human species." Centocor argued that the DNA that encodes its antibody is likely to contain nucleotide sequences that were inserted through N-nucleotide addition inside the cell of a transgenic mouse during production of the antibody. While Abbott conceded that N-nucleotide addition could have occurred, the court concluded that any nucleotide added by this non-template based phenomenon would not be derived from a non-human germline, and thus would not constitute the DNA of a non-human species. It went on to conclude that Stelara satisfies the "human antibody" limitation of the claims.

Based on this interpretation of "human antibody," the court held that Stelara infringes some of the asserted patent claims broadly directed towards pharmaceutical compositions comprising isolated human antibody capable of binding to an epitope on the P40 subunit of IL-12 (see for example claim 1 of US patent 7,504,485).

However, many of the asserted claims also include limitations that can only be ascertained by analytical testing, such as threshold Kd value or IC50. The district court declined to determine the infringement of these claims on summary judgment, given the fact that the experts disputed the results of tests that had been performed, and disagreed as to the methodology to be employed in performing the tests.

Thursday, March 1, 2012

Life Technologies Found Liable for Infringing Promega’s DNA Analysis Patents

On February 23, a district court in the Western District of Wisconsin granted a summary judgment motion finding that various Life Technologies products for DNA analysis, including AmpFISTR PCR kits, infringe Promega’s Patent Numbers 6,221,598; 6,479,235; 7,008,771; and Re37,984. The court awarded $52 million in damages to Promega.

Promega & Max Planck v. Life Technologies, Docket No. 10-cv-281-bbc (W.D.W).

Thursday, February 23, 2012

Two Newly Issued Meganuclease Patents Immediately Challenged by Cellectis in Declaratory Judgment Action

In an earlier post, I reported on patent infringement litigation between Cellectis and Precision BioSciences, two companies commercializing engineered I-CreI meganucleases as tools for specifically cleaving a targeted recognition site in double-stranded DNA.

On February 21, the patent office issued two new patents directed towards modified I-CreI meganucleases (8,119,361 and 8,119,381), and on the same day Cellectis filed declaratory judgment action against Precision seeking to establish that these patents are invalid and not infringed. These patents are continuations of 8,021,867, which is the subject of another declaratory judgment action filed by Cellectis last year. On their face, the patents indicate that they are assigned to Duke University, but Cellectis alleges that Precision is the actual owner of the patents. The infringement litigation between the parties began when Cellectis sued Precision for allegedly infringing Cellectis’s patent 7,897,372. The lawsuits have all been filed in Delaware District Court.

On Feb 21, Precision also filed a case in the Eastern District of North Carolina asserting the two newly issued patents against Cellectis.

Based on a quick reading of the claims, it appears that both the Cellectis patent and the Duke/Precision patents are directed towards rationally engineered variants of the I-CreI meganuclease with altered target specificity. The Cellectis and Duke/Precision claims focus on modification at different amino acid residues in protein, but it looks as though there would be substantial overlap in the claim coverage of the Precision and Duke/Precision claims. In particular, the claims all recite “at least” one amino acid substitution as specified by the claim, but all are written to encompass I-CreI meganucleases with additional amino acid modifications, so a I-CreI meganuclease modified at several locations in the amino acid chain could fall within the scope of patents owned by both parties.

Thursday, February 9, 2012

Will Gene Patents Derail the Next-Generation of Genetic Technologies?: A Reassessment of the Evidence Suggests Not

Last August I posted a draft article debunking the myth that 20% of genes are patented, and explaining that the widespread concern that human gene patents will impede whole genome sequencing is largely based on a misreading of the empirical evidence. I have continued to work on the project, and have just posted a follow-up article on SSRN entitled "Will Gene Patents Derail the Next Generation of Genetic Technologies?: A Reassessment of the Evidence Suggests Not.”. I plan to present some of the results at the USPTO hearings on gene patents and genetic testing to be held at the University San Diego on March 9. A brief abstract summarizing the article is provided below, the full article can be accessed here.

Judge Bryson recently asserted in Association for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent and Trademark Office (dissenting-in-part) that human gene patents “present a significant obstacle to the next generation of innovation in genetic medicine—multiplex tests and whole-genome sequencing.” His concern over the impact of gene patents on genetic testing, which coincides with his position that certain gene patents should be declared patent ineligible, reflects a widely held misperception that 20% of human genes are patented in a manner that would necessarily result in infringement by whole genome sequencing and other forms of genetic testing. In fact, the myth that 20% of human genes are patented is based on a gross misreading of a single "Policy Perspective" article published in Science in 2005, and an unfortunate tendency among many commentators to consider gene patents in abstract terms that disregard the critical role of patent claims in limiting the scope of a patent owner's right to exclude. Analysis of the claims of 533 of the of the patents identified in the Science article as "covering" human genes reveals that most do not include a single claim that would be infringed by whole genome sequencing and other forms of genetic testing. In fact, it seems quite likely that, were they to be litigated, few if any of these gene patents would be found to cover genetic testing or whole genome sequencing. Furthermore, a variety of practical limitations on enforcement and remedies appear to render it unlikely that the owners of these patents would be motivated to assert them against providers of whole genome sequencing and other next-generation diagnostic technologies in a manner that would impede progress in this area. There have been numerous instances in which fears that patents would harm biomedical research and medicine have proven in retrospect to have been greatly exaggerated, and history counsels against overreacting to the current controversy over gene patents. Ironically, it might be the case that the next generation of genetic diagnostic testing innovation will be adversely impacted not by too many patents, but by a lack of adequate patent protection.

Thursday, October 20, 2011

Claim Construction Ruling in Arzerra Infringement Case

On October 17, a judge in the Southern District of California issued a significant claim construction ruling in the case of Biogen Idec and Genentech v. GlaxoSmithKline. The plaintiffs allege that defendants anti-CD20 monoclonal antibody Ofatumumab (trade name Arzerra) infringes US patent number 7,682,612. Plaintiffs market a competing anti-CD20 antibody, Rituximab (trade name Rituxan).

Based on my understanding of the case, the ruling appears to be a substantial victory for GlaxoSmithKline.

The disputed claim terms are found in claim 1 of the patent, which recites:

1. A method of treating chronic lymphocytic leukemia in a human patient, comprising administering an anti-CD20 antibody to the patient in an amount effective to treat the chronic lymphocytic leukemia, wherein the method does not include treatment with a radiolabeled anti-CD20 antibody.

The court construed the terms "anti-CD20 antibody” and “CD20 binding fragment” as “rituximab and antibodies that bind to the same epitope of the CD20 antigen with similar affinity and specificity as rituximab” and "the portion of the anti-CD20 antibody that binds to the same epitope of the CD20 antigen with similar affinity and specificity as rituximab.” This is significant, because Arzerra does not bind to the same epitope as rituximab, which appears to rule out infringement if this construction of the terms is affirmed on appeal.

The plaintiffs argued for a broader construction, such that the disputed terms would cover any antibody that binds to CD20, even antibodies that bind to different epitopes, such as Arzerra. However, the court found that the prosecution history of the patent established that during prosecution plaintiffs represented that the claims were limited to antibodies binding to the same epitope as rituximab, and the court held them to this more limited construction of the term.

The court also construed the terms "does not include treatment with a radiolabeled anti-CD20 antibody" and "radiation is not used" as "excludes the use of a radiolabeled anti-CD20 antibody or the administration of a separate radiolabeled anti-CD20 antibody," and "no form of radiation (including radiolabeled antibodies) is used," respectively. This construction is significant, because it appears to rule out infringement when Arzerra is used in conjunction with Bexxar or Zevalin, which are both radiolabeled anti-CD20 antibodies.

Thanks to Docket Navigator for making me aware of the ruling.

Wednesday, October 19, 2011

Pioneer-DuPont Sues Monsanto for Infringing "Low Tech" Agricultural Biotechnology Patents

Yesterday Pioneer Hi-Bred (a subsidiary of DuPont) sued Monsanto, its rival in the agricultural biotechnology sector, for allegedly infringing its patents directed towards a method of increasing "seed vigor" in maize that entails defoliating maize plants during a specific period after pollination. The lawsuit was filed in the Southern District of Iowa, Pioneer's home territory.

The two companies have been involved in a high-profile patent litigation ever since Pioneer announced its plans to release genetically modified maize comprising Pioneers Optimum GAT trait stacked with Monsanto's Roundup Ready trait. Both traits confer resistance to glyphosate (i.e. Roundup), albeit by different mechanisms - Roundup Ready essentially works by rendering the plant resistant to glyphosate, while Optimum GAT causes the plant to express a protein that breaks down the glyphosate molecule.

Pioneer responded by suing Monsanto for antitrust violations, based on the company’s licensing and enforcement practices with respect to its patents covering the Roundup Ready trait. The patent infringement case is scheduled to go to trial next June, while the antitrust counterclaims are scheduled to go to trial April 2013.

The two patents being asserted by Pioneer in the most recent lawsuit are US patent numbers 5,518,989 and 6,162,974. The ‘989 patent claims a method of increasing seed vigor in maize by defoliating plants during a specific time window after pollination, based upon how long the growing plant has been exposed to warm days. The ‘974 patent claims an "assemblage" of maize seeds produced using the method. Here are a couple of representative claims.

Claim 1 from the ‘989 patent:

1. A method for treating a stand of maize plants, comprising the steps of

(A) reducing functional leaf area in substantially all of said plants, wherein said reducing is effected at between about 600 and about 850 GDDs after pollination of said plants, and then

(B) harvesting said stand, such that a seed assemblage is obtained from said stand that is characterized by a level of seed vigor that is enhanced relative to the level of seed vigor in a seed assemblage harvested from a comparison stand of maize plants not subjected to said reducing of functional leaf area.
Claim 1 from the ‘974 patent:

1. A maize seed assemblage having enhanced seed vigor, wherein said seed assemblage is obtained by the method comprising the steps of:

(a) reducing functional leaf area in substantially all of a stand of maize plants, wherein said reducing is effected at between about 600 and about 850 GDDs after pollination of said plants, and

(b) harvesting said stand to obtain an assemblage of seeds,

wherein said seed assemblage is characterized by a level of seed vigor that is enhanced relative to the level of seed vigor in a seed assemblage harvested from a comparison stand of maize plants not subjected to said reducing of functional leaf area.

According to Wikipedia, “GDD [,which stands for Growing Degree Day, is] a measure of heat accumulation used by horticulturists, gardeners, and farmers to predict plant and pest development rates such as the date that a flower will bloom or a crop reach maturity.” Wikipedia states that "plants grow in a cumulative stepwise manner which is strongly influenced by the ambient temperature. Growing degree days take aspects of local weather into account and allow gardeners to predict (or, in greenhouses, even to control) the plants’ pace toward maturity."



The patents state that "functional leaf area can be reduced" (i.e., the plant can be defoliated) using mechanical or chemical means. "Chemical means" would include treatment with an herbicide such as Roundup (the dependent claims explicitly identify Roundup as an herbicide to be used in the method.


The patents remind me of the patents at issue in In re Cruciferous Sprouts litigation that occurred several years ago. In that case, as I recall, researchers at Johns Hopkins University discovered that cruciferous sprouts (e.g., broccoli sprouts) harvested at a particular point in time after germination (in particular, prior to the "two-leaf stage") contain high levels of certain compounds believed to be useful in preventing cancer.

A representative claim at issue in that case recited " “A method of preparing a food product rich in glucosinolates, comprising germinated cruciferous seeds, with the exception of cabbage, cress, mustard and radish seeds, and harvesting sprouts prior to the 2-leaf stage, to form a food product comprising a plurality of sprouts.”

The Federal Circuit held that the claims were invalid based on inherent anticipation. Although the Johns Hopkins researchers might have been the first to recognize the health benefits of eating cruciferous sprouts harvested prior to the two-leaf stage, in fact people had been eating sprouts harvested at this stage for many years. This was surely the correct result - if the claims were held valid, that would mean that Johns Hopkins would have the right to exclude others from doing something that had long been part of the prior art, i.e., eating broccoli sprouts and the like.

The same sort of issue of inherent anticipation could potentially be raised with respect to Pioneer's patents on methods of defoliating maize plants at a certain time after pollination. It would seem to me that if Monsanto can show that, prior to Pioneers invention, maize plants had been defoliated during this stage of growth (perhaps by treatment with Roundup), a court might come to the conclusion that the claims are inherently anticipated.

The claims also might raise issues of patent eligibility, at least in the minds of people like Justice Breyer. Recall that in his LabCorp dissent Justice Breyer expressed a view that a patent claim that preempts substantially all practical use of a newly discovered natural phenomenon is patent ineligible. Some might characterize Pioneer’s discovery that defoliation of maize at a certain time results in increased seed vigor as the discovery of a "natural phenomenon," and conclude that Pioneer’s claims effectively preempt all substantial practical application of this discovery.

Pioneer's claims directed towards a "maize seed assemblage" might also raise patent eligibility issues. The claimed maize seeds are arguably not genetically modified, in which case they might be considered "products of nature" and not patent eligible under Chakrabarty. In order to be patent eligible, it would seem that a court would have to determine that either the defoliation resulted in a "man-made" seed, or that grouping seeds in an "assemblage" is sufficient human intervention to establish patent eligibility.

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

Patent Battle over Modified Meganucleases Heats Up

Meganucleases are endodeoxyribonucleases characterized by a large recognition site (double-stranded DNA sequences of 12 to 40 base pairs); as a result this site generally occurs only once in any given genome. For example, the 18-base pair sequence recognized by the I-SceI meganuclease would on average require a genome twenty times the size of the human genome to be found once by chance. Meganucleases are therefore considered to be the most specific naturally occurring restriction enzymes.

The high specificity of meganucleases gives them a high degree of precision and much lower cell toxicity than other naturally occurring restriction enzymes; they were identified in the 1990s as particularly promising tools for genome engineering.

However, the meganuclease-induced genetic recombinations that could be performed were limited by the repertoire of meganucleases available. Despite the existence of hundreds of meganucleases in nature, and the fact that each one is able to tolerate minor variations in its recognition site, the probability of finding a meganuclease able to cut a given gene at the desired location is extremely slim. Several research laboratories therefore soon began trying to engineer new meganucleases targeting the desired recognition sites.

Cellectis and Precision Biosciences are two competing biotechnology companies, both seeking to commercialize engineered meganucleases for use in genetic engineering.

On March 1, 2011, Cellectis sued Precision Biosciences in the District Court of Delaware for allegedly infringing US patent number 7,897,372, directed to "I-CreI Meganuclease Variants with Modified Specificity.” That case is presently proceeding with discovery, and trial is set for February 2013.

On September 20, 2011, the US patent office issued US patent number 8,021,867, which is directed towards "Rationally-Designed Meganucleases with Altered Sequence Specificity and DNA-Binding Affinity." The named assignee on the patent is Duke University, but according to Celectis the patent is actually owned by Precision.

On September 30, 2011, Cellectis filed another lawsuit against Precision Biosciences, again in the District Court of Delaware, and this time it is a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Duke/Precision patent is invalid and not infringed by Cellectis.

In the complaint, Cellectis does not allege that it has explicitly been threatened with a lawsuit by Precision. Instead, it argues that declaratory judgment is appropriate because: both patents-in-suit concern the same field of technology, i.e., "modified" or "altered" I-CreI meganucleases; the Cellectis patent is prior art to the precision patent, the parties in both cases are the same, and the discovery in both cases likely would substantially overlap.