Friday, August 17, 2012

Association for Molecular Pathology v. US PTO Decided on Remand


As reported in previous posts, on petition for certiorari the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit's 2011 decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. US PTO and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Mayo v. Prometheus. Yesterday, the Federal Circuit issued its decision on remand. Of course, this might not be the end of the story, since the plaintiffs will presumably petition for rehearing by the en banc Federal Circuit and/or certiorari by the Supreme Court. Some believe that the Supreme Court is likely to grant certiorari, based on the diverging opinions of the three Federal Circuit judges, and the arguably short shrift given by the majority to the relevance of Mayo to the Myriad claims.
Not surprisingly, the Mayo decision and the parties' subsequent re-briefing and re-arguing of the case did not alter the views of any of the three Federal Circuit judges deciding the case. As was the case in the first decision, the judges all agreed that the claims directed towards methods of testing for genetic variations in the BRCA genes are patent ineligible.  The majority (Judges Lourie and Moore) held the claims to isolated DNA molecules and the claim reciting a method for using a cell-based assay to screen for potential cancer drugs (claim 20) to be patent eligible. Judge Bryson, in dissent, agreed that claim 20 is patent eligible, but maintained his earlier position that the isolated DNA claims are patent ineligible, based largely on perceived policy concerns.

Writing for the majority, Judge Lourie noted that the only issue to be considered on remand was the applicability of the Supreme Court’s Mayo holding to the patent eligibility of the claims at issue.  He emphasized that the court was not addressing the overall patentability of the claims, only the eligibility of the claimed subject matter for patent protection, nor was the court addressing the policy concerns that had been raised with respect to "gene patents" and Myriads patent enforcement and licensing practices.
With respect to the isolated DNA claims, Judge Lourie found that Mayo "does not control," because the claims are directed towards compositions of matter, not methods. Recall that all of the claims at issue in Mayo were directed towards processes, not compositions of matter, and many  (including myself) have arguedthat Mayo is not applicable to composition of matter claims.


Judge Lourie appears to have adopted this position, explaining that “while Mayo and earlier decisions concerning method claim patentability provide valuable insights and illuminate broad, foundational principles, the "the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers set out the primary framework for deciding the patent eligibility of compositions of matter, including isolated DNA molecules.” Based on this premise, he ruled that “the issue of patent-eligibility [with respect to composition of matter claims] remains, as it was on the first appeal to this court, whether they claim patent ineligible products of nature.” In the view of the majority, the claimed isolated DNA molecules are not found in nature, and hence are not products of nature, but rather patent eligible compositions of matter.

The majority also held that Mayo did not alter the outcome with respect to the method claims. The patent ineligibility of the method of diagnostic claims was a foregone conclusion  - as interpreted by the Federal Circuit, they could be infringed by merely comparing DNA sequence information, and hence lie much further down the spectrum of patent ineligibility than the claims at issue in Mayo, which at least involved a physical step of analyzing a blood sample taken from a patient.


The patent eligibility of claim 20 was more in doubt. Conceivably, the claim could have been found patent ineligible under a broad reading of Mayo. In fact, Eli Lilly submitted an amicus brief arguing that claim 20 was patent ineligible because it involved a step that could be performed in the mind. If the court had adopted Lilly’s radical theory of patent eligibility, it could have drastically constricted the range of patent eligible methods (and in doing so substantially eased the freedom to operate concerns of research pharmaceutical companies such as Eli Lilly). However, the court declined to go down this route, and did not even mention Lilly’s proposal.
Judge Lourie essentially held claim 20 to be patent eligible because the claimed method is based on a man-made, non-naturally occurring (and hence patent eligible) material, i.e., a cell transformed with a BRCA gene.  This is an interesting interpreation of Mayo. Recall that the method claims found to be patent ineligible in Mayo all center around the analysis of man-made, non-naturally occurring (and hence presumably patent eligible) drugs and drug breakdown products.  Judge Lourie chose not explain the distinction between claim 20 and the method claims at issue in Mayo.

Questions Remaining

The decision leaves unanswered a number of questions. For example, the majority's decision with respect to the isolated DNA claims seems to depend upon the chemical structural differences between the claimed isolated DNA and DNA that occurs naturally. In particular, Judge Lourie emphasized that the isolation of DNA molecules inherently involves the breaking of covalent bonds, and hence the isolated DNA molecule is chemically distinct from its natural counterpart. Where does that leave isolated natural products that are not chemically distinct from their natural counterpart, i.e., what if the isolation of a natural product does not inherently involve breaking covalent bonds?

Judge Lourie makes much of a perceived distinction between "isolation" and "purification" of DNA molecules, and seems to suggest that the mere purification of a natural product might not be sufficient for patent eligibility. This is concerning, because isolated natural products have long been considered patent eligible.  The amicus brief submitted by the Biotechnology Industry Organization provides numerous examples of non-DNA isolated natural products that have been patented, and that have proven highly beneficial to society.

There is also the important question of to what extent methods of diagnostic testing, and personalized medicine, or eligible for patent protection in view of Mayo.  The Myriad method of diagnostic claims held to be patent ineligible in this case were interpreted by the court to cover the mere mental comparison of genetic sequence information, and clearly such claims are patent ineligible. But the vast majority of diagnostic claims involve physical steps such as obtaining physical samples from patients, performing clinical tests on the sample, and/or using the information generated in the treatment of a patient. It is not clear at this point how these claims would fare under a Mayo analysis, but Judge Lourie's opinion with respect to claim 20 suggests he would interpret Mayo in a manner that would maintain patent eligibility of at least some diagnostic/personalized medicine claims, if drafted more narrowly than Myriad’s claims.






Saturday, June 16, 2012

BIO, AUTM and the Coalition for 21st Century Medicine file amicus brief in Myriad Remand



The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), joined by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) and the Coalition for 21st Century Medicine (representing diagnostic companies) has filed an amicus brief in the Myriad case, available here.

BIO et al. argue that Mayo  (a Supreme Court decision specifically addressing the patent eligibility of process claims) does not apply to manufacture or composition of matter claims, and thus should not alter the Federal Circuit’s original decision finding all of the challenged isolated DNA claims patent eligible. They also argue that were the court to rule that the isolated DNA claims are patent ineligible, it would have far-reaching negative consequences for innovation, pointing out many examples in which important innovations that have benefitted healthcare and the environment have been incentivized by patents on isolated DNA molecules and other isolated natural products.

With respect to claim 20, the cell-based assay claim, they argue that the claimed method is clearly patent eligible since it recites the use of a transformed (i.e., genetically modified) cell that would itself be patent eligible.


U.S. Governemnt Files Brief in Myriad


The U.S. has filed a brief in Myriad, available here, which argues that under Mayo “isolated but otherwise unmodified DNA molecules are not patent-eligible because they are products of nature, not human-made inventions.” The government also argues that under Mayo the claims are patent ineligible because they effectively preclude the public from using a product of nature, and because the need for financial incentives in a particular field does not alter the requirements of § 101.

The brief I filed is available here.



Friday, June 15, 2012

And Many More Myriad Briefs

And here are links to more Myriad briefs for those interested:


Supplemental Brief for Appellant (Myriad)

Brief of Amici Curiae The National Women’s Health Network, et al

Brief of Amici Curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association

Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association, et al

Brief of Amici Curiae AARP, et al

Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association

Brief of Amici Curiae professor Eileen M. Kane in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance

Brief of Amici Curiae Mark J. Gatschet, et al.

Brief for Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association

More Myriad Briefs

Here are some more briefs recently filed in the remanded Myriad case.

ACLU and the Public Patent Foundation have filed their supplemental brief on behalf of plaintiffs, available here. Not surprisingly, they argue that the challenged isolated DNA claims, and claim 20 of the '282 patent (these cell based assay claim) are all patent ineligible under Prometheus, and for affirmance of the district court decision.

Knowledge Ecology International and Universities Allied for Essential Medicines have filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs, available here. They argue that isolated DNA patents hinder science and harm healthcare, and that adequate non-patent incentives for pharmaceutical innovation are available (such as FDA data/marketing exclusivity), and ask the Federal Circuit to affirm the District Court's decision.

Gilead Sciences, Confluence Life Sciences and Euclises Pharmaceuticals have filed a joint amicus brief that focuses exclusively on claim 2 of the ‘282 patent, i.e., the cDNA claim, and argues that cDNA is clearly man-made patent eligible subject matter. The brief, available here, asks the Federal Circuit not to reverse its earlier decision.






Amicus Briefs In Remand of Myriad

Today is the deadline for filing amicus briefs for the Federal Circuit to consider when it decides the Myriad gene patent litigation, i.e. The Association for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent and Trademark Office, on remand. The first time the Federal Circuit heard the case, I joined with Robert Cook-Deegan in filing a brief arguing that the isolated DNA claims should not be declared patent ineligible, but rather that their validity should be assessed under the more conventional requirements of patentability, i.e., novelty, nonobviousness and enablement. This time I went it alone, and filed a brief on my own behalf, available here (I believe that Bob will also likely be filing his own brief).

In my latest brief, I focus largely on the nature of genomic DNA and cDNA, and the processes by which they are "isolated," and argue that the challenged isolated DNA claims (when properly interpreted) are limited to synthetic molecules that did not originate in the human body, and which are substantially different from naturally occurring chromosomal DNA both structurally and functionally. I also address an argument made by the US government in its amicus brief, i.e., that cDNA is fundamentally different from isolated genomic DNA, and as a result claims limited to isolated cDNA should be considered patent eligible, while claims encompassing isolated genomic DNA are not patent eligible. To the contrary, I argue that isolated genomic DNA and cDNA are quite analogous, and are not different in a way that would justify differential treatment under the patent eligibility doctrine.

I also point out that the Federal Circuit’s earlier decision includes a number of unfounded assumptions regarding the utility of isolated genomic DNA, and the impact of isolated DNA patents on genetic testing and whole genome sequencing. The brief concludes by observing that a determination that any of the challenged isolated DNA claims is patent ineligible could cause serious unintended collateral damage to biotechnology, and should not be made cavalierly based on an overly simplistic and imprecise interpretation of the claims and speculation as to their potential preemptive effect.

Protein Sciences Corporation has filed its own Amicus brief, available here, which argues that:
Prometheus applies to method claims and does not change this Court’s correct decision as to the Representative Composition Claims, i.e., that isolated DNA molecules and cDNA are patent eligible subject matter under § 101; and that applying Prometheus to the Comparing or Analyzing Claims produces the same result as in Myriad, because the “transformed cells containing an altered BRCA1 gene causing cancer” are not naturally occurring cells, [and thus] the growing of those cells in the presence and absence of a putative cancer therapeutic in the Growth Rate Claim cannot be a method calling for applying a law of nature.
Eli Lilly has also submitted a brief, available here, which does not address the isolated DNA claims, but argues that claim 20 (the method claim reciting the use of BRCA gene in cell-based assay to screen for potential drug candidates) is patent ineligible if it includes a "mental step."

Tuesday, April 3, 2012

Computer-Implemented Method for Guiding Therapeutic Treatment Ruled Patent Ineligible under Mayo v. Prometheus

On March 30 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a lawsuit between Plaintiff SmartGene, Inc., a North Carolina corporation and Defendant Advanced Biological Laboratories, SA, a company with its principal place of business in Luxembourg, after declaring the patents in dispute (U.S. Patent No. 6,081,786 (the “786 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 6,188,988 B1 (the “988 patent”)) patent ineligible under 35 USC 101. (Click here for decision)

The plaintiff SmartGene brought the suit as a declaratory judgment action, after ABL filed a lawsuit alleging that “Smartgene’s IDNS™ HIV program incorporates at least one technology which infringes at least claim 1 of each [of] the ‘786 and ‘988 Patents.”

The court's analysis focused on Claim 1 of the ‘786 patent as exemplary of the subject matter covered by the patent dispute:

1. A method for guiding the selection of a therapeutic treatment regimen for a patient with a known disease or medical condition, said method comprising:
(a) providing patient information to a computing device comprising:
a first knowledge base comprising a plurality of different therapeutic treatment regimens for said disease or medical condition;
a second knowledge base comprising a plurality of expert rules for evaluating and selecting a therapeutic treatment regimen for said disease or medical condition;
a third knowledge base comprising advisory information useful for the treatment of a patient with different constituents of said different therapeutic treatment regimens; and
(b) generating in said computing device a ranked listing of available therapeutic treatment regimens for said patient; and
(c) generating in said computing device advisory information for one or more therapeutic treatment regimens in said ranked listing based on said patient information and said expert rules.

The district court began by observing that a recent Federal Circuit decision, MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp., had cast doubt upon the use of § 101 subject matter inquiry as a threshold question, and cautioned that lower courts should avoid the “swamp of verbiage that is § 101 by exercising their inherent power to control the processes of litigation, . . . and insist that litigants initially address patent invalidity issues in terms of the conditions of patentability defenses as the statute provides, specifically §§ 102, 103, and 112.” However, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mayo v. Prometheus had unambiguously rejected this approach, and firmly established “the § 101 subject matter patentability inquiry as the threshold inquiry for patent validity.
The court's analysis focused on comparing the claims at issue to “Supreme Court caselaw ‘guideposts’ on the subject of patent subject matter eligibility [Benson, Diehr, Flook, Bilski, Prometheus]; and then examining whether the patents-in-dispute [] satisfy the MOT test, and [] constitute eligible subject matter irrespective of the MOT test.”

The court analyzed the claim under the approach used by the Supreme Court in Prometheus, i.e., by determining that the individual steps recited in the claim method are "routine, well understood and conventional." The court concluded that the steps of the claim “describe abstract ideas that are commonly performed by medical professionals in evaluating, considering and constructing treatment options for a patient presenting a specific medical condition. As with the claim examined in Prometheus, these ‘steps consist of well understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately.’”

The machine or transformation test played a substantial role in the courts analysis. The court concluded that the claim failed the machine prong of the test because the “generic token reference of a ‘computing device’ in the claims [] does not identify any particular machine or provide any indication of what particular type of machine is to be used,” and because “the computing device referenced in the claims is incidental to the claimed invention and is not used for more than ‘insignificant postsolution activity’”.

Regarding the transformation prong of the test, the court held that “transformation must be central to the purpose of the claimed process” and the “mere manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the transformation prong.” The court concluded “that the defendants’ claims mirror the mental processes that a physician performs, and therefore embody the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’ that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’”

Thanks to Docket Navigator for making me aware of this decision.