Friday, August 28, 2015

Here Are All the Amicus Briefs That Have Been Filed Seeking En Banc Rehearing of Ariosa v. Sequenom


Yesterday I posted the amici brief I filed on behalf of BIO and PhRMA seeking en banc rehearing of Ariosa v. Sequenom.  Here are links to all twelve amicus briefs that were filed, in one place for your convenience.  Enjoy.  I have not read most of them, but I am glad to see people have taken notice and agree that there is a need for action.
 
 











 

 

 

Thursday, August 27, 2015

BIO and PhRMA File Amici Brief Urging En Banc Reconsideration of Ariosa v. Sequenom


The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) have jointly filed an amici brief curiae brief urging the Federal Circuit to grant en banc rehearing of Ariosa v. Sequenom.  The brief is available here.  I am the counsel of record.

BIO and PhRMA are concerned that the development and commercialization of a range of biotechnology and pharmaceutical innovations will be impeded if the Federal Circuit does not address the mounting uncertainty currently afflicting patentable subject matter jurisprudence.  The brief points out the critical importance of effective patent protection for biotechnology and pharmaceutical innovators, and the current unprecedented level of uncertainty with respect to the scope of patent eligible subject matter.  This uncertainty is affecting both the patent user community and the PTO, which has responded with an ongoing stream of revised and re-revised non-final and interim guidance documents.  With each new PTO Guidance, BIO members have observed an increasing rate of claim rejections, affecting a diverse range of biotechnology, including novel antibiotic molecules, industrial enzymes, diagnostic processes, and crop production products.

The unsettled state of the law has also created doubt as to whether issued patents will be able to withstand challenge. The brief points out that the vast majority of judicial decisions addressing patent eligibility under the recently articulated standards have resulted in a determination of ineligibility.  For example, Appendix 3 of the recent PTO “July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility,” identifies 24 post-Mayo  subject matter eligibility cases decided by the Federal Circuit, of which 22 held all of the challenged claims to be patent ineligible.

The brief urges the court to clarify the contours of both Step I and Step II of the Mayo two-step test for patent eligibility.  It posits that the Supreme Court would not have articulated a two-step test if it did not intend the first step to serve some meaningful gatekeeping function, but that under the standard applied by the panel it is difficult to see how any analytical or detection method would ever not satisfy Step I, so long as that method is designed to detect something that occurs naturally.  With regard to Step II, the brief asks for clarification with regard to the proper application of the “inventive concept” and “preemption” standards of patent eligibility.  As an example, the brief discusses the practical challenges facing the inventor of a new diagnostic test under the new patent eligibility jurisprudence.

In its recent decisions the Supreme Court apparently assumed the existence of limiting principles that would maintain patent eligibility for truly meritorious inventions (this was Judge Linn’s characterization of Sequenom’s claimed invention in his concurring opinion), even if that invention can be deconstructed into a combination of natural phenomena and conventional technology. The brief argues that en banc reconsideration would allow the Federal Circuit to address the nature of these limiting principles suggested in Mayo.  Alternatively, if the court finds that Supreme Court precedent does not provide for limiting principles that provide a meaningful opportunity for patenting important biotechnology innovations, that would suggest a need for the Supreme Court to readdress the contours of patent eligibility in the context of biotechnology. Ariosa v. Sequenom would be an appropriate vehicle for alerting the Supreme Court to the urgent need for this clarification.

Law Professors File Amicus Brief Supporting En Banc Rehearing of Ariosa v. Sequenom


A group of 23 law professors, myself included, have filed an amicus brief in support of en banc rehearing of Ariosa v. Sequenom.

The brief is available here.

Adam Mossoff, a professor at George Mason University School of Law and a Director at the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP), and Kevin Noonan, a partner at MBHB, took the lead in drafting the brief.

Eli Lilly v. Teva: District Court Applies the Federal Circuit's Recent Akamai Decision to Drug Method-of-Treatment Claim


In 2014 I published an article entitled “Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place: How Limelight Compounds the Challenges Facing Biotechnology Innovators after Mayo and Myriad” (available here), which explained how Supreme Court’s decision in Limelight Networks v. Akamai Technologies limiting the ability of patentees to establish liability in cases of divided infringement had undermined the value of method claims, particularly with respect to diagnostics and drugs.  In that article, I noted that in Limelight the Court had explicitly pointed out that its decision did not necessarily preclude the Federal Circuit from revisiting that court's decision in Muniauction, and to reinterpret 271(a) in a manner that would allow a patent owner to hold at least certain parties liable for active participation in a concerted act of divided infringement.  I also predicted that that the Federal Circuit would likely revisit the issue and expand 271(a) in a manner that would hold at least some divided infringer’s liable.

On Aug. 13, 2015, the Federal Circuit did just that when it issued an en banc opinion unanimously setting forth the law of divided infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and vacating the earlier panel decision. Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 2015 WL 4760450 (Fed. Cir.).  Akamai explicitly overruled prior case law regarding divided infringement, “[t]o the extent [those] prior cases formed the predicate for the vacated panel decision,” and no longer limited § 271(a) to principal-agent relationships, contractual arrangements, and joint enterprises.

Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), direct patent infringement occurs where all steps of a claimed method are performed by or attributable to a single entity. In Akamai, the court held that “[w]here more than one actor is involved in practicing the steps, a court must determine whether the acts of one are attributable to the other such that a single entity is responsible for the infringement.” On a claim for direct infringement of a method patent, the court will hold an entity responsible for anothers’ performance of method steps under two circumstances: (1) where that entity directs or controls others’ performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise. With respect to the former requirement, Akamai concluded that “liability under § 271(a) can also be found when an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance.” In those instances, the third party’s actions are attributed to the alleged infringer “such that the alleged infringer becomes the single actor chargeable with direct infringement.”
In Limelight, Eli Lilly filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court explaining the critical role of method-of-treatment claims in pharmaceutical innovation, and noting that such claims ‘‘routinely and sometimes necessarily present divided infringement issues.’’ According to Lilly, ‘‘[i]t has been increasingly common for patent challengers to argue that the relationship between these various actors does not meet the current standard articulated by the Federal Circuit necessary to find liability for direct infringement under 35 USC 271(a).’’

On August 25, 2015, Eli Lilly’s concerns were presumably at least partially abated by the district court's decision  in Eli Lilly v. Teva (available here).  The  Eli Lilly court applied the new Akamai standard and held that doctors directly infringed an Eli Lilly method-of-treatment claim, even though the claim explicitly recites the step of administering folic acid to a patient prior to administration of the drug, and it is the patient that takes the folic acid, i.e., the doctor does not administer the folic acid to the patient.  As a consequence, a generic company would be liable for inducing the doctor’s infringement based on drug labeling that instructs doctors to have their patients take folic acid prior to the doctor administering the drug to the patient.  It is significant that the generic drug company is required by law to use essentially the same label as the branded drug, and is thus required to “induce” doctors to instruct patients to take their folic acid.

In particular, the district court found that “the instant case involves the administration of a medical treatment, the factual circumstances are sufficiently analogous to those in Akamai to support a finding of direct infringement by physicians under § 271(a), and thus inducement of infringement by Defendants under § 271(b), under the legal standard recently set forth by the Federal Circuit.”  The generic company defendants argued unsuccessfully that the "actions of the patient in taking folic acid prior to [administration of the drug] cannot be attributed to the physician because the physician does not physically place the folic acid into the patients’ mouth, and because patients are instructed to obtain folic acid, either by prescription or over the counter, and take it on their own.”  But the district court found this argument to be premised on “now overruled case law on divided infringement,” and found the following language of the label to be unambiguous on this point:
The prescribing information requires physicians to “[i]nstruct patients to initiate folic acid 400 mcg to 1000 mcg orally once daily beginning 7 days before the first dose of ALITMA®.” Additionally, the patient information states “[i]t is very important to take folic acid . . . during your treatment with ALITMA to lower your chances of harmful side effects. You must start taking 400-1000 micrograms of folic acid every day for at least 5 days out of the 7 days before your first dose of ALITMA.” TX. 3017 at 2 (emphasis in original). It is clear from the patent, the prescribing information, and the patient information that taking folic acid in the manner specified is a condition of the patient’s participation in pemetrexed treatment as described by the patent, and is necessary in order to receive the benefit of such treatment. If the patient fails to carry out this step, he or she would not receive the benefit of the patented method, i.e. a reduction of potentially life-threatening toxicities caused by pemetrexed. The physician, based upon the patented method, directs the manner and timing of the patient’s ingestion of folic acid—400 to 1000 μg of folic acid for at least five days out of the seven days prior to and during pemetrexed administration—and the patient is required to do so to receive the full benefit of the treatment.

Wednesday, August 26, 2015

WARF Files Amicus Brief in Support of En Banc Rehearing of Ariosa v. Sequenom



The Federal Circuit’s discouraging opinion in Ariosa v. Sequenom has been discussed in previous posts.  Sequenom has petitioned for en banc rehearing, its brief is available here, Amicus briefs are due tomorrow, Aug 27, but WARF got its in a bit early, and it is available here.

Here is a summary of WARF’s argument, i.e., their argument as set forth in the Table of Contents:

  • The goal of the two-step Mayo/Alice framework is to ensure that patentees cannot effectively monopolize natural phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract ideas—no more and no less
  •  Where an inventor claims only an application that makes practical use of a natural phenomenon, the claims do not monopolize the natural phenomenon itself and are patent-eligible under Section 101
  • The panel’s analysis of Mayo/Alice Step Two was mistaken because isolation, amplification, and analysis of cffDNA in maternal fluids were not conventional


      More briefs will be posted shortly, including one I am helping to prepare for Biotechnology Industry Organization

Tuesday, July 21, 2015

Former Grad Student Fails in Bid for “Constructive Trust” in Professor’s Patent


On July 16, 2015, in Genspera v. Mahka, the Federal Circuit affirmed without discussion (i.e., under Rule 36) a district court decision denying a former doctoral student’s claim to a constructive trust in a patent issued to her former thesis advisor, a professor at Johns Hopkins University. The affirmed district court decision also denied her conversion claim against the professor.

The professor, along with another professor at Johns Hopkins, are named inventors on patents claiming a cancer prodrug. The graduate student, Mahka, claims that she came up with the idea for the only specific chemical compound claimed in the patents, a compound that is currently undergoing clinical testing. Genspera is a company started by the professors to develop and commercialize the prodrug.

Mahka initially sought to be added as an inventor to the patents, but the district court granted Genspera summary judgment because “a finding that Mhaka added an invention to the Application after the disclosure was filed would invalidate the Patents, and a district court cannot apply § 256 to require the Patent Office to add an inventor to an issued patent when doing so would invalidate the patent.”  The problem was that the prodrug allegedly invented by Mahka was not created until after the filing date of the patents.

Mahka then turned to state law causes of action. She claimed conversion of her invention by the professors, but the district court rejected this claim. The court found that under Maryland law the tort of conversion does not extend to completely intangible rights, and that Mahka’s asserted rights in the “invention” claimed in the patents was completely intangible.

Mahka also sought a constructive trust, a form of equitable relief which would have required the professors to share some of the benefits they derived from the patents, specifically stock in Genspera.  A constructive trust remedy is applied when “property has been acquired by fraud, misrepresentation, or other improper method, or where the circumstances render it inequitable for the party holding the title to retain it.” Its purpose is “to prevent the unjust enrichment of the holder of the property.”

The district court denied this claim, finding that it was barred by laches, i.e., Mahka waited too long to file her lawsuit.  The district court held that she needed to file her claim within three years of learning of the alleged failure to name her on the patent, and that she had waited more than four years.  After leaving Johns Hopkins, Mahka worked at a venture capital firm doing intellectual property research, which is where she allegedly learned of the patents.  She learned about them, and her omission as an inventor, in 2008, and contacted John Hopkins at that time, who advised her to hire her own lawyer. She waited until 2012 to file a lawsuit, at which point her cause of action was time-barred.

Monday, July 20, 2015

Federal Circuit Affirms IPR Invalidation of Columbia University Next-Generation Sequencing Patents


On July 17, 2015, in Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York v. Illumina , the Federal Circuit affirmed inter partes review (IPR) decisions invalidating all challenged claims in three Columbia University patents related to Next-Generation DNA sequencing. In particular, the three patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 7,713,698 (the “’698 patent”) (Appeal No. 2014-1547), 8,088,575 (the “’575 patent”) (Appeal No. 2014-1548), and 7,790,869 (the “’869 patent”) (Appeal No. 2014-1550) are directed towards synthetic nucleotide analogs that comprise the following features: (1) a deaza substitution in the base component of the nucleotide; (2)  a label attached to the base component (as opposed to the sugar component); and (3) a removable cap at the 3’OH position of the sugar component of the nucleotide. The nucleotide analogs are useful in automated sequencing-by-synthesis methods.

 In a nonprecedential opinion, the Federal Circuit found that that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) had not erred in finding all of the challenged claims either anticipated or obvious in view of seven prior art references. Most of the references are listed on the face of at least one of the patents, and thus (at least as a formal matter) were considered by the patent examiner during prosecution of the patents. In particular, the primary reference relied upon by the PTAB (Roger Tsien et al., WO 91/06678 (May 16, 1991) (“Tsien”)) was before the patent examiner. In a nutshell, the Federal Circuit agreed with the PTAB that the references disclosed all of the elements of the claimed inventions and provided a motivation to combine the elements, with a reasonable expectation of success.

 One of the issues on appeal was whether the PTAB had erred by not explicitly determining the level of skill in the art. The Federal Circuit held that under certain circumstances a failure to determine the level of skill, or an incorrect determination of the level of skill, can be a reversible error, but not always, particularly “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.” In this case, the Federal Circuit found that it was not necessary for the PTAB to explicitly define the relevant level of skill in the art.

 Interestingly, in making its arguments regarding level of skill in the art, Columbia actually argued against its own interests, as explicitly pointed out by the Federal Circuit. In particular, Illumina’s expert testified that one of skill in the relevant art would be knowledgeable with respect to molecular biology, while Columbia argued that one of skill in the art of DNA sequencing technology would be skilled in both molecular biology and chemistry. As pointed out by the Federal Circuit, the higher the level of skill in the art, the more likely it is that the invention would have been obvious to the skilled artisan. Thus, by arguing that the PHOSITA is skilled in both molecular biology and chemistry, Columbia was actually arguing that the PHOSITA has a higher level of skill, which would tend to make the invention more obvious. The Federal Circuit concluded that PTAB had not erred in finding that the invention would have been obvious to one skilled in molecular biology, and that it would have been even more obvious to one having skill in both molecular biology and chemistry.

The Federal Circuit also identified another instance in which Columbia made arguments that went against its own interest. Columbia argued that other companies had copied its invention from a grant application filed by the inventors, and that this “copying by others” was an objective indication that the invention was nonobvious. But Columbia also argued that these other companies had thought that they would be able to patent invention, which the Federal Circuit found was inconsistent with them having copied the invention. After all, how could they have thought that they could patent the invention if they had knowingly copied it from someone else’s grant application?

The Federal Circuit found that the near-simultaneous invention by others was a secondary consideration weighing “modestly in favor of obviousness.” In particular, two other entities were found to have independently come up with the invention prior to publication of the Columbia patent applications, i.e., prior to public disclosure of the invention. Columbia argued that this independent inventive activity did not constitute “prior art,” but the Federal Circuit criticized Columbia’s argument as reflecting “confusion over the difference between simultaneous invention on the one hand and anticipation and obviousness on the other.”

These IPRs arose out of an ongoing patent infringement litigation between Intelligent Bio-Systems Inc. (IBS, Columbia’s exclusive licensee) and Illumina, in which both sides have asserted that the other infringes patents relating to Next-Generation DNA Sequencing technologies.  Both sides have successfully invalidated some of their opponent’s patents using the IPR process. In Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York v. Illumina the Federal Circuit has affirmed the PTAB's invalidation of the IBS/Columbia patents.  We are still waiting to hear the outcome of Illumina’s appeal of the PTAB’s decisions invalidating a number of patent claims it has asserted against IBS (the parties’ briefs have already been filed in that case).